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Introduction 
                                                
While there is large number of central banks practicing the strategy of “managed floating”, 
this policy regime has so far received relatively little academic interest. Due to this “fear of 
floating” of many researchers1, the central terms “floating” and “managed floating” lack a 
clear and widely shared definition and there is no theoretical framework which lays down the 
core principles of such a strategy. As a consequence a central bank which intends to adopt 
managed floating receives almost no academic guidance for the concrete management of 
monetary and exchange rate policies.2 This lack of a positive as well as a normative theory of 
managed floating impairs above all the discussion about the transition to EMU by the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. As most economists are inclined to dismiss all 
intermediate regimes too easily, the academic discussion is unduly focused on the extreme 
solution of Euroization.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present three different definitions of 
floating: pure floating, independent floating, and managed floating. In order to identify these 
three different forms of floating, we develop a simple but efficient methodology. Compared 
with the approach by Calvo and Reinhart [2000], our method has the advantage that it allows 
for changes in the exchange rate strategy over time and that it provides a clear demarcation 
between the three variants of floating.  
 
In Chapter 3 we give a short survey of the literature. We show that the Mundell/Fleming 
model as well as the more refined models for open economy inflation targeting are unable to 
explain the high intervention activity of many central banks which can be observed 
empirically. In addition, with their reliance on UIP such models rest on a pillar for which no 
empirical evidence can be found.  
 
In Chapter 4 we present a simple theoretical framework for managed floating. It is shows that 
in such a regime monetary policy uses two operating targets simultaneously: the exchange 
rate and the short-term interest rate. We analyze the conditions under which such an exchange 
rate targeting is possible. Then we show how in an open economy a central bank has to set 
these two operating targets in order to achieve simultaneously 
 
• an internal equilibrium which is defined by an MCI which minimizes a social loss 
function, 
• an external equilibrium which is defined by a combined interest and exchange rate 
policy that is compatible with uncovered interest parity.  
 
We use a simple New-Keynesian model in order to demonstrate how the two operating targets 
have to be adjusted if the economy is affect by different shocks (demand shock, supply shock, 
foreign interest rate shock). As the adjustment of the two operating targets is identical under 
managed floating and under pure floating, the main difference between these two approaches 
concerns UIP shocks. The main advantage of managed floating is that it allows to avoid such 
 
1 While there was some discussion of this issue in the 1980s, in the last few years there are almost no 
publications with a title that is directly related to exchange rate system of floating or managed floating; for 
instance, in EconLit since 1990 only 17 publications can be found under “managed float” and 21 publications 
under “managed floating”. 
2 See Fischer [2001] about foreign exchange market interventions in system of managed floating: “This is one of 
the remaining areas in which central bankers place considerable emphasis on the touch and feel of the market, 
and where systematic policy rules are not yet common” (ibid., p. 7). 
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shocks as long as the central bank is able to keep the exchange rate on a path determined by 
the interest rate differential.  
 
We also discuss the shortcomings and implications of managed floating. As managed floating 
is characterized by an unannounced exchange rate path, a separate anchor for private sector 
expectations is required in small open economies. A second shortcoming of managed floating 
is the limited ability of central banks to defend an exchange rate path in a situation of strong 
speculative outflows. Finally, under an uncoordinated managed floating countries can 
manipulate the exchange rate in order to improve their international competitiveness.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the compatibility of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II with 
managed floating. While this framework is flexible enough to allow a combined targeting of 
the exchange rate and the interest rate, its intervention and credit mechanisms are too much 
shaped by the requirements of ERM I with its narrow ±2.25 per cent bands and a predominant 
role of marginal interventions. As a consequence it provides almost no support for and even 
hinders intra-marginal interventions. In our view, the ERM II could be easily modified above 
all by providing more generous credit facilities for intramarginal interventions. This would 
reduce the vulnerability of managed floating in the case of capital outflows and help to 
transform the ERM II from a not very pleasant waiting room into a business class lounge for 
EMU aspirants.  
 
The last Chapter summarizes the main results and concludes. 
 
Defining and identifying three forms of floating 
“Floating”: the predominant exchange rate regime in the New Millennium 
In the last decade the international monetary order has undergone a dramatic transformation. 
Intermediate regimes which had been the prevailing exchange rate arrangement in the early 
1990s are now only used by about one third of the IMF’s member countries (see Table 1). In 
the group of developing and emerging market economies the decline has been even more 
pronounced. For the country groupings of all countries and of emerging market economies 
floating has been the preferred alternative to intermediate regimes. Table 1 shows that for all 
three country groupings floating has become the predominant exchange rate arrangement. 
Hard pegs could also profit from the “vanishing middle”, especially in developing countries, 
but their market share remains much lower than the share of floating. 
 
Table 1: Exchange rate arrangements 1991 and 1999 
 Hard Pegs Intermediate Floating 
Year 1991 1999 1991 1999 1991 1999 
All countries 16% 24% 62% 34% 23% 42% 
Emerging market economies 6% 9% 64% 42% 30% 48% 
Developing and emerging 
market economies 5% 25% 65% 27% 29% 47% 
Source: Fischer [2001] 
 
In the literature this “hollowing out” has been widely welcomed and is even recommended as 
an optimum solution for almost all countries (Fischer [2001], Frankel [1999], Summers 
[2000]). Eichengreen [1999] has become a specially prominent promoter of this approach: 
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“Hence, the IMF needs to more forcefully encourage its members to move to policies of 
greater exchange rate flexibility, and the sooner the better. With few exceptions it 
should pressure its members, in the context of Article IV consultations and program 
discussions, to abandon simple pegs, crawling pegs, narrow bands and other 
mechanisms for limiting exchange rate flexibility before they are forced to do so by the 
markets.” (ibid., p. 105) 
 
Three forms of floating 
As Table 1 shows, in many policy-related discussions the spectrum for exchange rate 
arrangements is reduced to the three central options of “hard pegs”, “intermediate regimes”, 
and “floating”. While this gives some impression on the main choices, an understanding of 
managed floating requires a more detailed classification. In our view, the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics classification of exchange regimes is quite useful in this regard. It uses the 
following eight categories: 
 
a) Exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender (dollarization, membership 
in a currency union) 
b) Currency board arrangements 
c) Other conventional fixed peg arrangements (formal or de facto peg with a narrow 
margin of at most ± 1 per cent around a central rate) 
d) Pegged rates within horizontal bands (formal or de facto peg with margins that are 
wider than ± 1 per cent around a central rate) 
e) Crawling pegs (the currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed, pre-
announced rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators) 
f) Crawling bands (the currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins around 
a central rate that is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed, pre-announced 
rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators) 
g) Managed floating (no pre-announced path for the exchange rate; the monetary 
authority influences the movement of the exchange rate through active intervention in 
the foreign exchange market without specifying, or pre-committing to, a pre-
announced path for the exchange rate) 
h) Independent floating (the exchange rate is market determined, with any foreign 
exchange market intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing 
undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than establishing a level for it)  
 
At least from a theoretical point of view it seems useful to add an additional category: 
 
i) Pure floating (the exchange rate is market determined with no foreign exchange 
market intervention at all; changes in foreign exchange reserves are due to technical 
factors only). 
 
As already mentioned, many authors summarize the arrangements g), h), and i) under the 
heading of “floating”. This can create the impression that the economic rationale of these 
three arrangements is more or less identical. However, a careful reading of the IMF’s 
description of g) and h) and of our category i) shows a very important difference: 
 
• Managed floating implies that the exchange rate path is determined by the central bank 
(or the government).  
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• Pure and independent floating imply that the exchange rate path is mainly market 
determined. 
 
In other words, what distinguishes managed floating from the intermediate solutions e) and f) 
is not a different form of exchange rate determination, it is mainly the fact that there is no 
preannounced path for the exchange rate (see ). Figure 1
Figure 1: Exchange rate regimes 
 
classification of exchange rate regimes
exchange rate is mainly market
determined
↓
pure and independent floating
exchange rate is mainly determined
by the monetary authorities
↓
exchange rate targeting
no preannounced target
↓
managed float
preannounced target
constant target
↓
fixed exchange rates
variable target
↓
crawling pegs
with central bank
↓
fixed peg
without central bank
↓
currency board  
 
As a consequence, for a theoretical understanding of managed floating it is not sufficient to 
treat it simply as a variant of independent or pure floating, for which the elaborate theories of 
flexible exchange rates are available. The very fact, that under managed floating central banks 
try to target the exchange rate requires a positive analysis of this policy, as well as a 
normative theory designing policy rules for managed floating. 
 
Governments do not always tell the truth 
The need for a precise definition of floating exchange regimes applies not only to economists. 
As the research by Calvo and Reinhart [2000] has shown, national governments and/or central 
banks do not seem to pay too much attention to the exact definitions in the IMF’s forms. The 
starting point for Calvo and Reinhart is the textbook model of flexible exchange rates (or our 
option “pure floating”) which is characterized by a constant level of foreign exchange 
reserves. Therefore, Calvo and Reinhart identify “floating” (in our taxonomy: “pure floating”) 
by a high probability that the monthly per cent change in foreign exchange reserves falls 
within a ± 1 or ± 2.25 per cent band. As there are always technically determined changes in 
reserves, Calvo and Reinhart use the data of the United States and Japan as a benchmark. In 
other words, a lower probability for small reserve changes is regarded as an indication that a 
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country is not following a policy of floating (in or taxonomy; “pure floating”). The polar case 
of fixed exchange rates is characterized by a low probability that the monthly per cent change 
in nominal exchange rate falls within a ± 1 or ± 2.25 per cent band. Again, the United States 
and Japan are used as a benchmark. Table 2 presents the main results of the study by Calvo 
and Reinhart 
 
Table 2: Main results of the Calvo and Reinhart (2000) study 
Foreign exchange reserves 
volatility Exchange rate volatility 
Regime 
+/- 1 
per cent band 
+/- 2.25 
per cent band 
+/- 1 
per cent band 
+/- 2.25 
per cent band 
Independent floating3 16.2 33.9 51.8 79.4 
Managed floating 17.8 39.2 60.1 87.5 
Limited flexibility 20.8 45.9 64.6 92.0 
Fixed 15.4 36.5 83.1 95.9 
USA 28.6 62.1 26.8 58.7 
Japan 44.8 74.3 33.8 61.2 
Source: Calvo and Reinhart [2000] 
 
The most striking result of this study is the very small difference between the polar options of 
independent floating and fixed rates as far as the changes in foreign exchange reserve 
volatility are concerned. In addition the independent floaters behave completely different than 
the two benchmark countries. The same applies to the category “managed floating”. In other 
words, most of the countries which classify themselves as independent or managed floaters 
are actively intervening on the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate volatility of 
independent and managed floaters is also much lower than in the United States and Japan and 
if is analyzed within the ± 2.25 per cent band, the difference to fixed rates is not very 
pronounced, especially for managed floating.  
 
In sum, the results of Calvo and Reinhart as well as of a related study by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger [2002] show that it is important to make a clear distinction between the textbook 
ideal of “free floating” and the reality of “independent” and “managed floating”.  
 
A different approach for identifying three variants of floating 
While the study by Calvo and Reinhard has contributed to a much better understanding of 
“floating”, it has the important drawback that it cannot distinguish between the three different 
forms of floating. Another problem of this study is that it analyses very long periods (up to 
February 1973 – April 1999). This can have the disadvantage that a singular strong 
intervention activity or changes in intervention behavior in the more recent past cannot not be 
identified. Finally the Calvo/Reinhart study normalizes changes in reserves by relating them 
to reserve levels. This can be misleading if countries start an intervention period with different 
reserve levels although their overall macroeconomic data are roughly similar or if countries 
accumulate large reserve levels over time.  
 
A new method for measuring different forms of floating  
In order to avoid these short-comings, we present a new methodology for identifying different 
forms of floating. We start with two different methods to proxy the intervention activity of a 
country: 
                                                 
3 Excluding Japan and the United States 
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1. changes in foreign reserves minus gold (Res) as a ratio of the external sector’s size 
measured by a twelve-month moving-average of the arithmetic mean of imports (Im) 
and exports (Ex); 
2. changes in foreign reserves minus gold (Res) as percentage of the level of reserves at 
the beginning of the underlying period. 
 
The first normalization procedure has the advantage that changes in reserves are related to the 
size of a countries’ external sector. To some extend this also takes into account differences in 
the total economic size. The second method was chosen to produce results that are 
comparable to those of the Calvo/Reinhart study. 
 
As a first step we want to identify the overall intervention activity of a country. For this 
purpose we add the absolute values of normalized changes in reserves for a period of n=6 and 
of n=12 months. Thus, we do not discriminate between the monthly values of net sales and 
net purchases of foreign exchange reserves. The resulting variable is called sum of absolute 
changes (Sabs1, Sabs2):  
 
(1) ( ) ∑ +−+= = −−−−
−−
−−
−n
0i 1it1it
1it
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it
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−−
= −−−
∑ −
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The superscripts 1 and 2 refer to the method of normalization. If Sabs is low (i.e. approaching 
zero), a country’s overall intervention activity is low. As in Calvo and Reinhart [2000] we 
chose the U.S. as a benchmark which we assume to be a pure floater.  
 
The difference between the two methods of normalization can be illustrated quite easily with 
the four charts of Figure 2. In the upper two charts we depicted the proxies for the 
intervention activity Sabs1 and Sabs2 for Japan and the US. While the two lines differ only 
slightly in the case of the US, the differences in the conclusion that one would draw in the 
case of Japan are striking. According to the thin line (method 2) the Japanese exchange rate 
policy would be judged as a non-interventionist one, similar to what results for the US. In the 
study of Calvo and Reinhart [2000] which uses a similar technique (monthly change in 
foreign exchange reserves as a percentage of the level of reserves) Japan is classified as even 
more independently floating than the US (see ). The major problem with this approach 
is the bias that emerges with an increasing level of reserves. The same sale or purchase of 
foreign exchange measured in US dollars becomes less important the higher the base in terms 
of which the percentage change is measured. From the lower two charts we can see that the 
Japanese authorities accumulated large amounts of foreign reserves during the last two 
decades (the figures depicted are in millions of US dollars). The average rate of growth 
amounted to a multiple of the rate of growth of the external sector. In contrast to this, the two 
variables seem to have a common long-run trend in the US so that the measurement bias 
described above does not occur. This explains why the two methods approximately yield the 
same results for the US. In order to eliminate such a bias, in the following we only use the 
second normalization method. 
Table 2
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Figure 2: Different methods of proxying intervention activity 
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In a second step we calculate the sum of effective changes (Seff1, Seff2) of reserves again for a 6 
and a 12 month period: 
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We then divide the sum of effective changes by the sum of absolute changes of reserves for 
each normalization method and for each time horizon. The resulting ratio allows us to 
differentiate between independent floaters and managed floaters. We therefore labeled it index 
of floating (Ifloat): 
 
(5) ( ) ( )( )t1abs
t
1eff
t
1float
nS
nS
nI = , 
(6) ( ) ( )( )t2abs
t
2eff
t
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nS
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Ifloat assumes values ranging from minus one to plus one. A value close to zero indicates that a 
central bank has not changed its total level of reserves during an observation period. As this is 
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compatible with a high value of the denominator, a low value of Ifloat shows that interventions 
were mainly carried out in order to smooth short-term fluctuations around an exogenously 
determined trend. This behavior is typical for a strategy of independent floating as it is 
defined by the IMF.  
 
A value of Ifloat close to plus or minus one implies that the intervention activity was associated 
with a change in reserves during the observation period. This can be regarded as an indication 
that a central bank has tried to influence the trend of the exchange rate. Thus, such values of 
Ifloat can be regarded as a marker for managed floating. In addition, the sign of this indicator 
shows whether the central bank has tried to intervene against an appreciation (a positive sign: 
net purchases of the central bank) or a depreciation (a negative sign: net sales of the central 
bank) of its currency.  
 
Data description and proceeding 
Our sample consists of 14 developed market economies and 30 emerging market economies4 
that have been classified as independent or managed floaters according to the IMF’s quarterly 
Exchange Rate Arrangements published in the International Financial Statistics (IFS). Our 
data is monthly from January 1975 to November 2000. The variables used in our calculations 
are all from the IFS. Reserves (Res) are measured by “Total Reserves minus Gold” (line 1l.d), 
exports and imports by line 70 and 71. If the latter were denominated in national currency, we 
converted them into US dollars with the average monthly dollar exchange rate (line rf). 
 
For each month during the period that a country reports its exchange rate regime as an 
independent or a managed floater we calculated the two variables of interest Sabs and Ifloat. The 
periods and the reported regimes are summarized in Table 8 (see 
). Since some countries followed different exchange rate strategies in the whole 
period, we get a total of 65 cases for the 6-month horizon and 62 cases for the 12-month 
horizon. We then computed the frequency distribution of each variable for each period.  
Appendix 1: Country 
coverage
 
For our classification of exchange rate regimes we proceed as follows. In a first step we try to 
find out whether a country is a pure floater or not. For this purpose we look at the value of Sabs 
of our benchmark country, the United States. We see that for both time horizons there is a 100 
% probability that the sum of absolute reserve changes is less than the average of the sum of 
monthly imports and exports during the observation periods (i.e. Sabs ≤ 1.0, see Table 11 and 
 in ). For the 6-month horizon the United 
Kingdom (09/92-11/00), Canada and Poland (04/00-11/00) can also be regarded as pure 
floaters. For the 12-month horizon only the United Kingdom (09/92-11/00) can qualify as a 
pure floater; for Poland the experience with floating is not long enough.  
Table 12 Appendix 2: Probability distributions
 
For those countries which cannot be not classified as pure floaters we try to identify whether 
their intervention policy can be classified as independent or managed floating. For this 
purpose we use the index floating. We assume that a range of –0.33 < Ifloat < 0.33 describes 
independent floating; the ranges of –1 ≤ Ifloat ≤ –0.33 and 0.33 ≤ Ifloat ≤ 1 are regarded as a 
policy of managed floating. If the probability of –0.33≤ Ifloat < 0.33 is at least 50 %, we 
classify a country as an independent floater, if it is lower a country is classified as a managed 
                                                 
4 We distinguish between developed market economies and emerging market economies as in Fischer [2001]. 
This restriction allows us to concentrate on the subset of developing countries which are integrated with world 
capital markets. As we were also interested in the exchange rate policy of the Eastern European accession 
countries, we additionally included Slovenia in our analysis. 
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floater. Since we lack a benchmark country, the interventions of the United States are to small 
to be used for this purpose, we had to chose these critical values somewhat arbitrarily. 
 gives an overview of this classification procedure.  
Figure 
3
Figure 3: A classification of floating exchange rate systems 
 
Prob(Sabs = 1) = 1
↓
pure floating
Distribution of Sabs
Prob(Sabs = 1) < 1
↓
other floating
Prob(-0.33 < Ifloat < 0.33) ≥ 0.5
↓
independent floating
(exchange rate smoothing)
Prob(-0.33 < Ifloat < 0.33) < 0.5
↓
managed floating
(exchange rate targeting)
Distribution of Ifloat
 
 
Main results 
A summary of the results of our classification is presented in Table 3 and Table 4 (for the 
detailed country results see  and  in ). 
For the 6-month observation period they show that most floating countries can be regarded as 
managed floaters regardless whether we focus on all regimes that were in existence in the 
whole period from 1975 until 2000 or on those that are still in existence. Only 23 % of the 
IMF’s independent floaters are pure floaters or independent floaters according to our 
classification. For the 12-month observation period a more even distribution between 
independent and managed floating emerges. Again there is no strong correlation with the 
IMF’s classification: only 48 % of the IMF’s independent floaters were true independent 
floaters and only 46 % of the managed floaters were true managed floaters. Thus, depending 
on the observation period our analysis shows that managed floating is either the most widely 
used form of floating or a more or less equally important form of floating as independent 
floating.  
Table 13 Table 14 Appendix 2: Probability distributions
 
Table 3: IMF classification and our classification for floating using 6-month periods  
  Our classification Sum 
  Pure float Independent float Managed float  
Independent float 4 (4) 3 (2) 24 (15) 31 (21) IMF 
classification Managed float - 4 (0) 31 (10) 35 (10) 
Sum  4 (4) 7 (2) 55 (25) 66 (31) 
Note: The figures in brackets indicate the number of regimes that are still in existence. 
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 Table 4: IMF classification and our classification for floating using 12-month periods  
  Our classification Sum 
  Pure float Independent float Managed float  
Independent float 2 (2) 11 (8) 14 (10) 27 (20) IMF 
classification Managed float - 19 (6) 17 (4) 36 (10) 
Sum  2 (2) 30 (14) 31 (14) 63 (30) 
Note: The figures in brackets indicate the number of regimes that are still in existence. 
 
The importance of managed floating becomes even more obvious if we use our methodology 
for the analysis of time series. Thus, we can observe for each country how the values of Sabs 
and Ifloat vary over time. Of course this approach has the effect that even with a low overall 
probability situations with high values of Sabs can be reached from time to time. The most 
interesting case is Japan. According to the cross-section analysis which covers the period 
from 1975 to 2000 the probability for high interventions in Japan is relatively low so that 
Japan is not very different from the pure floaters (see  and  in 
). However, the time series for Japan show a quite different picture 
(see Figure 2). Especially in the years 1999 and 2000 its intervention activity is very high and 
it is associated with values of Ifloat that exceed +0.33 for most of the time which clearly 
indicates that the Japanese authorities targeted an exchange rate path. In other words, there 
has been a clear regime change which cannot be detected .with the approach of Calvo and 
Reinhart or any other forms of a cross-section analysis. Thus, an analysis of time series of the 
two intervention indicators has the advantage to filter out episodes of high intervention 
activity and episodes of low intervention activity within the whole period considered as well 
as episodes where exchange rate targeting (managed floating) or exchange rate smoothing 
(independent floating) prevailed. Moreover it allows us to identify changes in the intervention 
policy of a country. 
Table 11 Table 12 Appendix 2: 
Probability distributions
 
What can we learn from the literature? 
The empirical analysis shows that there three different approaches under the general heading 
of floating. While pure floating and independent floating are more or less discussed in the 
extensive literature on flexible exchange rates, there has been astonishingly little theoretical 
discussion of managed floating. Above all it is unclear  
 
• why countries try to target the exchange rate directly, 
• how the exchange rate can be controlled effectively, and  
• how the exchange rate paths should be determined that are targeted under managed 
floating. 
 
The first question leads to the old debate about fixed versus flexible rates that we do not want 
to discuss here. In our view an important explanation of the widespread use of managed 
floating is the very weak statistical relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and a 
floating exchange rate. In the words of Frankel and Rose [1995]: 
 
“To repeat a central fact of life, there is remarkably little evidence that macroeconomic 
variables have consistent strong effects on floating exchange rates, except during 
extraordinary circumstances such as hyperinflations.” (ibid., p. 1709) 
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The low interest in the second and third question seems mainly due to the semantic confusion 
that was already mentioned. Since most economists do not differentiate between the three 
forms of floating they seem to believe that the so-called inconsistency triangle provides 
already a sufficient framework for a analysis of the relevant arrangements in exchange rate 
policy. According to this metaphor a country can choose between the following options (see 
): Figure 4
Figure 4: Inconsistency triangle 
 
• a fixed exchange rate with a lack of an autonomous interest rate policy and free capital 
mobility (I), 
• an autonomous interest rate policy with a freely floating exchange rate and free capital 
mobility (II), 
• capital controls and a combination of a fixed exchange rate and an autonomous 
interest rate policy (III). 
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As the effectiveness of controls for capital inflows and outflows is very limited, at least on a 
sustained basis (Ariyoshi et al. [2000]), the menu is reduced to the first two options. 
 
The main problem of this presentation is its focus on the polar solutions of either absolutely 
fixed or absolutely flexible exchange rates (pure or independent floating). In other words it 
has nothing to say about a policy of managed floating where the exchange is  
 
• neither fixed, since it is targeted along an unannounced exchange path,  
• nor flexible in the sense of a market-determined rate, since the central bank intervenes 
in order to keep the exchange rate close to the target path. 
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The Mundell-Fleming legacy 
The theoretical framework for the inconsistency triangle is the well-known Mundell-Fleming 
model which is the workhorse for almost all textbooks on open economy macroeconomics. 
But in spite of its popularity the model is not very well designed for a world of managed 
floating. As a comparative-static model it cannot cope with dynamic processes in exchanges 
rates, i.e. exchange rate paths and exchange rate expectations. In other words, the polar view 
presented in the inconsistency triangle is not so much a result of sound theoretical reasoning 
but rather the outcome of an outdated economic model which by its very nature cannot deal 
with policy options other than absolutely fixed or absolutely flexible exchange rates.  
 
In addition, the standard textbook presentation of the Mundell-Fleming model only focuses on 
a domestic monetary policy that tries to follow a more expansionary interest policy than in the 
anchor currency country. Thus, it overlooks the more interesting situation of a central bank 
that follows a more restrictive policy which leads to capital inflows and an increase in foreign 
exchange reserves. In this context the scope for sterilized interventions is also not sufficiently 
analyzed. We will discuss this in more detail below. 
 
Open economy inflation targeting 
Managed floating is a major challenge not only to the old fashioned but also to more elaborate 
models of international macroeconomics. Important models with monetary policy rules for 
open economies have been presented by Ball [1999] and Svensson [2000]. Both authors base 
their papers on a textbook view of free floating.  
 
Svensson [2000] assumes that the flexible exchange rate is determined even in the short-run 
by a variant of the absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) and by the uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP). As a result, foreign exchange market interventions are not discussed as an 
independent monetary policy instrument.  
 
However, both textbook assumptions are not compatible with the empirical evidence. It is 
well-known that pricing-to-market can lead to strong deviations from PPP in the short-run 
(see Rogoff [1996]). The systematic deviations of exchange rate changes (“forward discount 
bias”) from UIP have been discussed in many papers (see Froot and Thaler [1990]). In other 
words, if a central bank follows the policy rule prescribed by Svensson, it has to be aware of 
the fact that it relies on unrealistic exchange rate theories. This discrepancy between the 
Svensson model and the reality can be regarded as an explanation of why there is so much 
foreign exchange market intervention by central banks although the model implicitly assumes 
that such transactions are not necessary.  
 
The paper by Ball [1999] uses a rather simple structure for the international linkages of an 
open economy. Instead of the UIP it simply assumes a positive relationship between the real 
exchange rate qt and the domestic real interest rate rt which can be disturbed by shocks νt: 
 
(7) qt = θ rt + νt. 
 
Of course, this description of the reality is even more problematic than the Svensson model 
since it disregards the foreign interest rate. In addition, for short-term foreign portfolio 
investments it is not the real but the nominal interest rate that matters. Real interest rate 
differentials are relevant for international portfolio decisions only if PPP holds all the time.  
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Nevertheless, the Ball paper provides an important building bloc for a theory of managed 
floating. It presents a monetary policy rule for an open economy which is based on the 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as a “policy instrument”. In Chapter 0 we will introduce 
the MCI concept more formally. Ball defines the MCI as a weighted average of the real 
interest rate and the real exchange rate and derives it from the minimization procedure of a 
central bank’s loss function. He correctly states: 
 
“The rationale for using an MCI is that it measures the overall stance of policy, 
including the stimulus through both r and e [the real exchange rate in his notation; the 
authors]. Policy makers shift the MCI when they want to ease or tighten.” (ibid., p. 131) 
 
But subsequently he specifies his policy rule as follows: 
 
“When there are shifts in the e/r relation - shocks in equation (3) [our equation (7); the 
authors] - r is adjusted to keep the MCI at the desired level.” 
 
In other words, even though he accepts the central role of the exchange rate for monetary 
policy in an open economy, he grounds his theory on a purely floating exchange rate system 
where the only instrument of monetary policy is the interest rate.  
 
In sum, the models by Ball and Svensson cannot provide a theory of managed floating since 
they do not take into account the lack of a stable relationship between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the exchange rate which is the very rationale of managed floating. As a 
consequence, both models disregard the role of foreign exchange market interventions (in the 
sense of managed floating) as an independent monetary policy instrument. In Chapter 0 we 
will come back to their understanding of monetary policy in small open economies and we 
will present the strategy of independently floating exchange rates and its major flaws within 
the scope of the open economy model that we are going to introduce in Chapter 0. 
 
John Williamson’s proposals 
John Williamson is the most prominent promoter of intermediate exchange rate systems, 
above all in the form of crawling peg (Williamson [1996]), and more recently in the BBC-
variant (Williamson [2000]) which calls for wide bands, a basket peg and a crawl.  
 
If managed floating is interpreted as a form of a non-announced exchange rate path, 
Williamson’s proposals come relatively close to it. However, there are also some important 
differences. First, Williamson proposes a very specific form of an exchange rate path: the 
active crawl, which is characterized by a rule that depreciates the domestic currency vis-à-vis 
the foreign currency (or a basket of foreign currencies) according to 
 
• the difference between the targeted domestic and the foreign inflation rate minus 
• a factor which takes into account differences in the domestic and the foreign 
productivity growth (Ricardo-Balassa-effect). 
 
A second difference between the reality of managed floating and Williamson’s proposals 
concerns the role of interventions. Williamson favors a very cautious attitude towards 
exchange market interventions which becomes evident in his preference for “soft buffers”. As 
our empirical analysis has shown, many central banks follow a much more offensive approach 
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since they do not hesitate to intervene for prolonged period of time and with large amounts of 
money.  
 
A theoretical framework for managed floating 
i
t
A map of managed floating  
Our very short survey of the literature has shown that so far no comprehensive theory of 
managed floating is available. In the following we develop a simple policy framework for 
managed floating which is based on the simultaneous use of the exchange rate and the interest 
rate as operating targets of monetary policy. We will show that these two instruments have to 
set in order to achieve simultaneously external and internal equilibrium (see ).  Figure 5
Figure 5: Monetary policy in small open economies 
 
The external equilibrium is by itself not a final target of monetary policy, but under policy of 
managed floating a central bank has to respect the UIP condition in order to avoid high costs 
of sterilization. This condition keeps profits for short-term investors close to zero and thus 
removes the incentive for short-term capital inflows. It is characterized by 
 
(8)  ft 1 t t ts s i+ − = −
 
where st is the nominal exchange rate (a rise is a depreciation), it the domestic nominal 
interest rate, and i  the foreign nominal interest rate. ft
 
The internal equilibrium is characterized by the minimizing the central bank’s loss function. 
In other words, combination of the interest rate and the exchange rate has to generate an 
optimum monetary condition index. 
 
(9) . optt tMCI r q= −ψ
 
We will see that the optimum MCI determines the inflation rate so that the instrument 
variables of monetary policy (it and st) which are directly controllable by the central bank can 
also be discussed in the form of their real counterparts rt and qt .  
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Our framework is a typical example for the analysis of economic policy by Tinbergen [1952] 
who has shown that in order to meet two independent targets two instruments are required that 
need to be efficient and independent from each other.  
 
Targeting the exchange rate with sterilized interventions 
The simultaneous management of the exchange rate and the interest rate implies that the 
central bank is able to target the exchange rate by means of sterilized interventions. This is 
possible since the central bank has two independent instruments at its disposal: 
 
• With open-market operations (or any other refinancing operation) a central bank 
exchanges short-term domestic notes (or other short-term domestic liabilities) against 
domestic central bank reserves in order to target the short-term interest rate. As a 
result the monetary base changes and the central bank balance sheet is extended.  
• With foreign exchange market interventions a central bank exchanges foreign sight 
deposits against domestic central bank reserves in order to target the exchange rate. If 
the intervention is sterilized, the monetary base remains constant and also the size of 
central bank balance sheet. However, the structure of the central bank’s assets has 
changed.  
 
In both cases the operating target is controlled directly by interventions in the relevant market 
(domestic money market, foreign exchange market).  
 
While it is uncontested today that central banks are able to perfectly control short-term 
interest rates, many economists are in doubt that a direct control of the exchange rate is 
possible at all. They either argue that this due to the sheer size of foreign exchange markets or 
that a control of the exchange rate can only be achieved with a limited control over the 
interest rate which is normally not acceptable. For instance, Schwartz [2000] concludes: 
 17
 
“(...) monetary policy can support either domestic or external objectives. Monetary 
policy cannot serve both.” (ibid., p. 26) 
 
Or, to put it the other way round, if both instruments are assumed to be independent from each 
other due to complete sterilization of the liquidity effects of foreign exchange market 
interventions, then interventions are deemed to be ineffective. Finally sterilized intervention 
can be associated with interest rate costs that a central bank is not willing to accept. In the 
following we will discuss these points more in detail. 
 
The flow channel of interventions matters 
The effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions has been discussed in many 
theoretical and empirical studies. The results are mixed especially for the case of sterilized 
interventions (Sarno and Taylor [2001]). The most serious flaw of this literature is that almost 
all papers analyze the mark-dollar rate. As we have shown in the empirical part of our paper, 
interventions in this market have been extremely small so that the lack of a firm empirical 
evidence for the effectiveness of such interventions can simply be explained with an 
insufficient dose of intervention. In other words, analyses of the mark-dollar rate cannot be 
taken as an evidence for the ineffectiveness of managed floating in emerging market 
economies and other developed countries where the relative amount of interventions is in 
some case several times higher (see Table 11 and  in 
). 
Table 12 Appendix 2: Probability 
distributions
 
Figure 6: The flow channel of foreign exchange market interventions 
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The microeconomics of intervention can be described with a simple diagram for the foreign 
exchange market (see ). On the y-axis is the price of foreign exchange in terms of the 
domestic currency. Thus, there is an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping 
demand curve for foreign exchange. The equilibrium exchange rate is S0. Foreign exchange 
market intervention implies that the central bank targets a higher or a lower exchange rate 
than the market-clearing rate. If the central bank targets a rate S1 that is higher than the 
equilibrium rate, there is an excess supply of foreign exchange which it has to buy in 
exchange for domestic reserves. As a result its net foreign assets (NFA) will grow. In the case 
of a targeted rate S2 below the market-clearing rate, there is an excess demand for foreign 
exchange which the central bank has to satisfy by selling foreign assets out of its foreign 
exchange reserves (∆NFA<0). As a consequence the commercial banks’ reserves decline. As 
far as the effectiveness of interventions is concerned there is no doubt that the central bank 
can target a different exchange rate than S0 as long as it is able to fill the gap between the 
quantity demanded and the quantity supplied in disequilibrium.  
Figure 6
 
Of course the ability to target S1 is completely different than the ability to target S2. In the first 
case which identifies an intervention policy that tries to target a weaker exchange rate than the 
market rate the, central bank’s foreign exchange reserve increase. In the second case which 
characterizes an attempt to keep the exchange rate at a stronger level than market-clearing 
level, the central bank loses foreign exchange reserves. Thus, in the first case there is no limit 
to the intervention policy since the central bank can always increase the domestic liquidity. In 
the second case, the central bank operates under a “hard budget constraint” which makes it 
difficult to pursue such an intervention policy over a prolonged period of time.  
 
 
Table 5: Size of local foreign exchange markets 
 
Average daily 
turnover of local 
currency in the local 
foreign exchange 
market in millions of 
US-$ (April 1998) 
Column 1 as a 
percentage of total 
reserves minus gold 
(1998, end of year) 
Column 1 as a 
percentage of the 
external sector's size 
(1998) as defined in 
Chapter 2.4 
Column 1 as a 
percentage of the 
GDP (1998, in US-$) 
 1 2 3 4 
Australia 23600 161.20 39.05 6.47 
Austria 3014 13.44 4.62 1.43 
Belgium 10706 58.59 6.31 4.28 
Canada 25869 110.99 12.43 4.25 
Denmark 5564 36.45 12.00 3.20 
Finland 2566 26.47 6.82 1.99 
France  32634 73.65 10.97 2.26 
Germany 62145 83.95 12.27 2.89 
Hong Kong 18711 20.87 10.44 11.50 
Ireland 3569 37.98 6.53 3.99 
Italy 22500 75.28 9.71 1.89 
Japan 124045 57.57 37.20 3.26 
Luxembourg 1637  21.41 8.93 
Netherlands 18651 87.08 9.59 4.92 
New Zealand 4928 117.23 39.81 9.23 
Norway 5350 28.75 14.12 3.67 
Portugal 2983 18.85 9.45 2.79 
Singapore 17644 23.55 16.43 21.27 
Spain 13007 23.54 0.02 2.35 
Sweden 6285 44.58 44.58 44.58 
Switzerland 31611 76.74 42.44 12.03 
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United Kingdom 114817 356.45 39.12 8.12 
United States 315872 446.68 38.84 3.59 
     
Argentina 2173 8.78 7.51 0.73 
Bahrain 21 1.95 0.61 0.34 
Brazil 5127 12.04 9.18 0.65 
Chile 1212 7.74 7.21 1.66 
China 211 0.14 0.13 0.02 
Czech Republic 4169 33.24 15.13 7.48 
Greece  5361 30.71 31.55 4.42 
Hungary  554 5.95 2.28 1.18 
India 1389 5.08 3.64 0.33 
Indonesia 972 4.28 2.55 1.03 
Malaysia 660 2.58 1.00 0.91 
Mexico 8543 26.87 11.61 2.03 
Philippines 492 5.33 1.61 0.75 
Poland 1315 4.97 3.55 0.83 
Russia 4728 60.60 6.82 1.70 
Saudi Arabia 1422 10.00 4.14 1.11 
South Africa 7289 167.30 0.86 0.18 
South Korea 2289 4.40 2.03 0.72 
Thailand 2574 8.93 5.29 2.30 
 
Source: BIS, IFS, own calculations 
 
As far as the size of the foreign exchange market is concerned, the figures of a daily 
transactions volume of about 2,000 billion dollar are related to the market-maker principle by 
which the foreign exchange market is organized. Due to this principle which generates a “hot 
potato effect” (see Bofinger [2000]), an individual transaction can lead to a multiple of 
foreign exchange market turnover. Thus, central bank interventions at much smaller scales 
can be successful. For instance, in the period from June 1999 to June 2000 the Bank of Japan 
managed to stop a further appreciation of the yen with a total intervention volume of about 
100 billion dollar, which is only 5 % of the daily global transactions volume.  
 
This is also confirmed by the data for local foreign exchange turnover. They show that 
because of its role of a vehicle currency on the foreign exchange market the dollar turnover is 
extremely high compared to the stock of total foreign reserves or the size of the external 
sector of the United States. For many emerging market economies, however, the relative size 
of the turnover is considerably smaller so that central banks can affect the exchange rate with 
relatively small intervention volumes (see , columns 2 and 3). We calculated for 
example that the turnover measured as a percentage of the external sector’s size was on 
average more than three times higher in developed market economies compared to emerging 
markets. 
Table 5
 
Sterilized interventions can be effective 
This leads to the second argument which is raised against foreign exchange market 
interventions. If a central bank intervenes in order to keep its currency from appreciating 
(depreciating), it increases (reduces) domestic liquidity which ceteris paribus is identical with 
a more expansionary (restrictive) monetary policy stance. Due to this direct connection it is 
often argued that any attempt to control the exchange rate is associated with a reduced control 
over the interest rate.  
 
This argument neglects the fact that most central banks dispose over different instruments 
with which they can mop up the excess liquidity that is created by foreign exchange market 
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interventions. As Table 6 shows such a policy of sterilization is very common in those 
countries that we identified as managed floaters (see  in 
). For each country we estimated the following sterilization equation: 
Table 14 Appendix 2: Probability 
distributions
 
(10) ∆NDAt = β1∆NFAt + β2∆NDAt-1 + ut. 
 
Under complete sterilization the coefficient β1 of the change in net foreign reserves (∆NFAt) 
is expected to be -1, for net domestic credit (∆NDAt) is systematically varied to offset the 
effect of reserve acquisitions and losses on domestic liquidity.5 Ten of the 27 managed 
floaters had a sterilization coefficient smaller than –0.90, and for 19 of them it was less than –
0.70. 
 
How does sterilization work in practice? For the case of an intervention that increases 
domestic liquidity the sterilization can be achieved as follows:  
 
• As long as the banking system is a net debtor of the central bank, credits to the 
banking system can be reduced in parallel with foreign exchange market interventions. 
An instrument which is especially suitable for that purpose are the ECB’s security 
repurchase agreements with a maturity of up to two weeks that are conducted on a 
weekly basis. 
• For the case of interventions that exceed this form of sterilization a central bank has to 
issue interest-bearing short-term notes with which the excess liquidity can be 
neutralized. A similar and even more simple instrument is the deposit facility which 
has been established by the European Central Bank. Such an interest bearing facility 
has the advantage that it provides a sterilization potential that is unlimited, at least in 
principle. So far, this instrument is not very common with other central banks, but it is 
not a major technical problem to establish such a facility which is simply an additional 
interest-bearing account for each commercial bank with the central bank. 
 
In this context it is important to note that the literature uses two different definitions of 
sterilization which depend on the domestic operating target of the central bank. If a central 
bank uses the monetary base as its operating target, sterilization means that the amount of 
monetary base is not affected by interventions. Based on this definition the estimation 
presented in Table 6 was made. If a short-term interest rate (overnight rate, one or three 
month rate) serves as the domestic operating target, sterilization has to guarantee an 
unchanged level of this rate. As almost all central banks in the world use the interest rate as 
their domestic operating target, we will use the second definition of sterilization. At first sight 
both definitions seem almost identical, but in the situation of shocks to the domestic money 
market, the two control options lead to very different results (Bofinger [2001]).  
 
Table 6: Sterilization coefficient in managed floating economies 
Dependent variable: ∆NDAt    
 Explanatory variables Statistics 
 ∆NFAt ∆NDAt-1 R2 DW n 
Argentina -1.05 (-17.64)*** 0.56 (14.42)*** 0.81 2.24 121 
Australia 2 -0.66 (-9.89)*** 0.13 (2.22)** 0.37 1.89 202 
Brazil 1 -0.92 (-19.95)*** -0.12 (-2.50)** 0.89 1.66 53 
                                                 
5 The lagged values of ∆NDA were included to capture other effects than the sterilization policy of the central 
banks. The data is monthly and all taken from the IFS (lines 11 to 17). 
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Brazil 2 -0.88 (-8.21)*** -0.18 (-1.70)* 0.61 2.02 46 
Brazil 3 -1.13 (-4.39)*** -0.29 (-2.00)* 0.59 2.32 21 
Bulgaria -0.77 (-29.07)*** -0.27 (-7.25)*** 0.98 1.50 21 
Chile 1 -0.23 (-3.87)*** -0.21 (-3.06)*** 0.06 1.80 200 
Colombia 1 -0.76 (-10.20)*** -0.35 (-5.02)*** 0.56 2.24 96 
Egypt -1.03 (-18.24)*** -0.04 (-0.87) 0.72 1.94 134 
Finland -0.44 (-5.36)*** -0.14 (-1.28) 0.41 2.01 47 
India 1 -0.76 (-3.57)*** -0.19 (-2.53)** 0.03 1.99 167 
India 2 -0.26 (-1.65) -0.13 (-1.26) 0.05 2.02 91 
Indonesia 2 -0.91 (-21.81)*** 0.00 (0.03) 0.94 2.45 34 
Israel 1 -0.77 (-3.85)*** 0.18 (1.19) 0.28 1.56 35 
Israel 2 -0.67 (-8.88)*** -0.09 (-1.17) 0.43 2.17 106 
Japan -0.94 (-4.91)*** -0.47 (-9.55)*** 0.27 2.41 306 
Korea 2 -1.09 (-15.75)*** -0.04 (-0.64) 0.85 2.40 34 
Malaysia -0.77 (-4.96)*** 0.10 (0.84) 0.37 1.95 56 
Mexico 1 -0.95 (-16.11)*** -0.13 (-2.64)*** 0.72 1.98 103 
Peru -0.57 (-8.88)*** -0.18 (-2.63)*** 0.42 2.18 124 
Poland 1 -0.89 (-13.36)*** -0.20 (-3.23)*** 0.68 2.17 80 
Singapore -0.83 (-16.88)*** 0.02 (0.44) 0.56 2.43 154 
Slovenia -1.01 (-31.40)*** -0.11 (-3.44)*** 0.92 2.69 88 
Sri Lanka -0.85 (-18.95)*** -0.20 (-4.78)*** 0.59 2.35 262 
Thailand 2 -0.29 (-1.20) 0.09 (0.53) 0.06 1.90 31 
UK 1 -1.05 (-15.00)*** -0.05 (-0.81) 0.80 2.39 61 
Venezuela 1 -0.83 (-6.55)*** -0.04 (-0.40) 0.50 2.09 47 
 
Note: OLS estimation, t-values in parentheses, *** (**) [*] = significant at the 1 (5) [10] per cent level; for 
Bulgaria, Colombia 1 and UK 1 only quarterly data was available for the whole period; 
 
Many economists are in doubt whether sterilized intervention can have a direct effect on the 
exchange rate since with such interventions the relative domestic money supplies remain 
constant. For instance Rosenberg [1996] argues:  
 
“According to the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, central bank 
intervention that does not alter the supply of money relative to the demand for money 
will not have a perceptible impact on exchange rates.” (ibid., p. 298)6 
 
For an understanding of sterilized intervention it is necessary to describe in more detail the 
transactions and their impact on the balance sheets of the central bank, commercial banks and 
non-bank investors. We start with a situation where a euro area commercial bank (CB€) holds 
100 € reserves with ECB which it has obtained via a repo credit. At the same time a euro area 
investor (IN€) holds a 100 $ deposit with a United States commercial bank (CB$). We neglect 
from minimum reserves and assume that the dollar/euro exchange rate is 1:1. 
 
1st round (intervention):  
We now assume that the investor wants to exchange his dollar deposit into a euro deposit. For 
this purpose he sells the deposit to CB€ which in turn sells it on the foreign exchange market. 
We assume that the ECB intervenes and purchases the dollar deposit from CB€. The counter-
value of the deposit is credited to the CB€’s account with the ECB. Thus, the euro reserves 
increase. 
 
2nd round (sterilization):  
The ECB sterilizes the intervention by reducing its repo credits to CB€.  
 
                                                 
6 See also Sarno and Taylor [2001]. 
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As a result, the monetary base in the euro area and in the United States (which we do not need 
to present) has remained unchanged. The foreign deposits with CB$ have also not changed, 
but the ECB has become a depositor instead of IN€. Thus, the dollar deposits held by non-
central banks have declined. At the same time, the euro deposits held by non-banks with the 
CB€ have increased. In other words: even with constant monetary base in both areas, the 
relative amount of deposits held by the public have changed. This has been compensated by 
the ECB which holds more dollar assets and less euro assets since it has reduced its euro 
denominated repo credits. Thus, with sterilized interventions a central bank enters an open 
position the foreign currency – a long position if it purchases foreign exchange, a short 
position if it sells foreign exchange.  
 
Seen from this perspective sterilized intervention implies a certain commitment by a central 
bank since in both cases the risk of the open position is at least partially determined by the 
central bank’s own actions. In the case of an appreciating currency, the central bank runs the 
risk that the domestic value of its foreign exchange reserves is reduced by an appreciation of 
the domestic currency which the central bank is able to prevent. In the case of a depreciating 
currency the opposite applies but the budget constraint of foreign exchange reserves makes 
the commitment less binding. 
 
As these portfolio adjustments are the driving force of sterilized interventions, the literature 
obviously suffers from an incorrect identification of the relative monetary bases with the 
relative amount of deposits held by the public in the two currencies.  
 
A very common assumption in this regard is the assumption of a perfect substitutability 
between assets denominated in different currencies. In the words of Sarno and Taylor [2001]: 
 
“(...) it is tempting to conjecture that the portfolio balance channel will diminish in 
importance over time – at least among the major industrial countries – as international 
capital markets become increasingly integrated and the degree of substitutability 
between financial assets denominated in the major currencies increases.” (ibid., p.862) 
 
While this seems plausible for risk-neutral investors, it does not hold if investors are risk-
averse. The very fact that investors incur transactions for exchanging a dollar deposit into a 
euro deposit indicates that the two assets are not regarded as perfect substitutes. With a 
perfect substitutability of dollar and euro assets it would be also difficult to explain the huge 
trading volume on foreign exchange markets. Why should banks trade assets of about 2 
billion dollar per day if they are complete substitutes? In other words, increasing capital 
mobility does not mean that the assets traded are substitutes. On contrary, large capital flows 
are an indication that investors see important qualitative differences in assets that are 
denominated in different currencies or issued by debtors from different regions.  
 
How can the costs of sterilization be avoided 
Thus, we have shown that a central bank is always able to avoid an unwarranted appreciation 
of its currency without losing control over the domestic interest rate. The remaining problem 
are the costs of sterilization ( ). These costs that are supposed to occur in period t (defined 
per unit of domestic currency that is supplied in interventions in period t-1) are made up of 
two components: the interest rate costs (or earnings) ( ) and the valuation losses (or returns) 
from foreign exchange reserves ( ): 
S
tC
i
tC
V
tC
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The interest rate component of sterilization is determined by the difference between the 
foreign and the domestic interest rate: 
 
(12) . i ft t 1 tC i i− −= − 1
1
1−
                                                
 
This is due to the fact that a sterilized intervention that tries to prevent an appreciation leads to 
an increase in foreign assets and a decrease in domestic assets; in the case of a deposit facility 
or the issuance of notes, domestic liabilities increase. Thus, the central bank loses income 
from domestic assets (or has to pay interest on domestic liabilities) while it receives additional 
income from an higher amount of foreign assets. It is obvious that sterilized interventions are 
associated with interest costs (returns) if the domestic interest rate is higher (lower) than the 
foreign interest rate. 
 
The valuation costs (returns) per unit of sterilization depend on the percentage change of the 
exchange rate which we express by the difference of the log of the nominal exchange rate: 
 
(13) . ( ) t1ttVt sssC ∆−=−−= −
 
If the domestic currency depreciates, the value of foreign exchange reserves in terms of the 
domestic currency increases. The central bank makes a profit from sterilized intervention. 
 
Both cost components can be combined in order to define conditions under which sterilized 
interventions are free of charge: 
 
(14) , ( )!S ft t 1 t 1 t tC 0 i i s s− − −= = − − −
 
which leads to the ex post formulation of the interest parity condition: 
 
(15) . ( ) ft t 1 t 1 ts s i i− −− = −
 
In other words, the costs of sterilized intervention are zero if a central bank targets the 
exchange rate in a way that it follows a path that is determined by the interest rate differential. 
This guarantees at the same time that there are no profit opportunities for short-term oriented 
investors which invest in the domestic currency. If the domestic interest rate is higher than the 
foreign interest rate this advantage is fully compensated by a depreciation of the domestic 
currency. Thus the condition of zero costs for sterilized interventions is the mirror image of 
the condition that the mix of exchange rate and interest policy should not provide profit 
opportunities for short-term oriented investors. In fact, the profits of these investors are to a 
large extent nothing else but the sterilization costs paid by the central bank.7 
 
In sum, the exchange rate can targeted by the central bank without a budget constraint, 
without costs and without negative side effects on interest rate policy, if 
 
 
7 As far as domestic commercial banks receive deposits denominated in the domestic currency and grant credits 
in the foreign currency, they also pay for the profits of short-term oriented investors.  
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• the domestic currency is appreciating vis-à-vis the foreign currency, 
• its sterilization potential is unlimited, which can be arranged by offering a deposit 
facility, 
• the targeted exchange rate path is compatible with the prevailing interest rate 
differential. 
 
A control over the exchange rate is more difficult, if a central banks tries to counteract a 
depreciation and/or if it follows exchange rate paths that are associated with high sterilization 
costs e.g. if the domestic currency is kept stable although the domestic interest exceeds the 
foreign interest rate.  
 
External equilibrium 
For the discussion of the external equilibrium in an open economy we assume free capital 
mobility. In order to understand the role of the external equilibrium in the context of managed 
floating it is important to take a deeper look at the behavior of the two major participants of 
the foreign exchange market: the private investors and the domestic central bank.8 
 
The private investor’s external equilibrium 
The private sector’s equilibrium condition is captured by the well-known uncovered interest 
parity: 
 
(16) . ft t t t 1i i E s +− = ∆ + ε t
1
 
According to UIP, in equilibrium the return on domestic investment it equals the expected 
return on foreign investment which itself is the sum of the foreign interest rate i , the 
expected exchange rate change 
f
t
t tE s +∆  and, depending on the underlying monetary and 
exchange rate regime, a time-varying risk premium tε . If this condition is met, private market 
participants should be indifferent between the domestic and the risky foreign investment. 
Hence, short-term9 capital flows do not occur. 
 
The central bank’s external equilibrium 
The equivalent of the private investor’s arbitrage condition is the central bank’s zero-cost-
condition. In Chapter 0 we explained the mechanics of sterilized foreign exchange market 
interventions. One basic result was that if central banks want to make independent and 
efficient use of the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate as operating target, the costs 
of sterilization have to be zero. This has led to the ex post interest parity condition which we 
formulated in equation (15). By augmenting the time subscript by 1 we can now derive the 
central bank’s external equilibrium condition: 
 
(17) . f Tt t ti i s +− = ∆ 1
                                                
 
 
8 We will see later on that the foreign central bank also has an important impact on our equilibrium conditions, 
mainly by setting the foreign short-term interest rate . But as this will be treated as being exogenous to the 
domestic central bank’s policy decision, it is sufficient to concentrate on these two participants. 
f
ti
9 In our context the short term refers to a period of one or at most three months which corresponds to the 
maturity of the interest rates that is normally assumed to be under the control of the central bank. 
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According to equation (17) the central bank targets an exchange rate path (∆ ) that is equal 
to the difference of the domestic interest rate i
T
t 1s +
t (set by the central bank as well) and the 
exogenous foreign interest rate i . ft
 
The overall external equilibrium and the central bank’s intervention response function 
The overall equilibrium condition can be obtained by inserting equation (16) into equation 
(17): 
 
(18) . Tt 1 t t 1 ts E s+ +∆ = ∆ + ε
 
That is to say, if the central bank’s targeted exchange rate path equals the private sector’s 
expected exchange rate change plus the actual risk premium, there is no need for the central 
bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market and the balance of payments is in 
equilibrium. 
 
Otherwise, there is a case for central bank interventions. Two basically different situations 
have to be distinguished: 
 
In the first case, private investors expect to make a profit from an investment in the domestic 
currency which leads to capital inflows. The sum of the private sector’s expectations about the 
future exchange rate path and the required risk premium are more than compensated by the 
given actual interest differential and the given actual spot rate: 
 
(19) . f Tt t t 1 t t 1i i s E s+ +− = ∆ > ∆ + ε t
 
In a world of managed floating the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market in 
order to absorb the excess supply of foreign exchange. This guarantees that the central bank 
achieves the desired exchange rate path Tt 1s +∆
1
. At the same time, it is able to keep the interest 
rate at its level it because of the immediate sterilization of the accumulated foreign reserves. It 
is important to underline that in this case the central bank is neither restrained by its stock of 
foreign reserves (the bank is able to buy unlimited amounts of foreign reserves) nor by any 
costs of sterilization (by achieving Tts +∆ , the bank perfectly fulfils the zero-cost-condition). 
 
The second case is characterized by capital outflows which can be described as follows: 
 
(20) . f Tt t t 1 t t 1i i s E s+ +− = ∆ < ∆ + ε t
 
The actual interest rate differential does not compensate for the expected exchange rate 
change and the required risk premium, and hence, international investors prefer the foreign 
investment. As the central bank’s objective is to realize Tt 1s +∆ , it has to sell foreign assets in 
order to satisfy the excess demand for foreign exchange. Here again, the sterilization issue is 
not a problem as long as the desired exchange rate path is achieved. But in contrast to the first 
case (the capital inflow case), now the central bank is restrained by its stock of foreign 
reserves (see Chapter 0). But this does not mean that the central bank is not able to realize 
 at all. As long as its reserves exceed a critical threshold, say NFATt 1s +∆ c, the central bank can 
credibly achieve the desired path through sterilized interventions. But as soon as the current 
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stock of foreign reserves is perceived as too low by the international investors, capital 
outflows will accelerate and the central bank looses its intervention instrument. 
 
In sum, sterilized foreign exchange market interventions can be described by the following 
implicit function: 
 
(21) ( )Tt t t 1 t t 1I NFA f s E s+ += ∆ = ∆ − ∆ − ε t
1
t
, 
 
where f(0) is equal to zero and where the first derivative f’ is always positive. Theoretically, It 
can adopt values ranging from –NFAc to infinity. Thus, equation (21) completes our flow 
channel analysis of foreign exchange market interventions in Chapter 0. 
 
In three of the cases described above (the capital inflow case, the case without interventions, 
and the capital outflow case with sufficient foreign reserves) the central bank is able to realize 
its target path for the exchange rate: 
 
(22) . f Tt t ti i s +− = ∆
 
We call this the “control situation”. There is only one, but of course very important, case in 
which the central bank looses the control over its operating target: the capital outflow case 
with foreign reserves falling below a critical threshold. In this situation which we call “out-of-
control situation”, the central bank is no longer able to target the exchange rate through 
sterilized interventions. It rather has to adjust its interest rates in order to stop the capital 
outflow. This adjustment can be achieved by either reducing the domestic part of the 
monetary base, or by non-sterilized foreign exchange market interventions which lowers the 
foreign part of the monetary base. Independently of how domestic interest rates are raised, the 
external equilibrium condition in the out-of-control situation becomes 
 
(23) . ft t t t 1i i E s += + ∆ + ε
 
Figure 7
Figure 7: The external equilibrium 
 summarizes again the major relationships underlying the external equilibrium of our 
strategy. 
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Internal equilibrium 
In order to derive the internal equilibrium condition, we start with the transmission channels 
of monetary impulses in a small open economy. For the conduct of monetary policy it is 
important to differentiate between two channels: the exchange rate channel and the interest 
rate channel (see Svensson [2000]).  
 
With the interest rate channel, monetary policy affects aggregate demand via its effect on the 
short-term real interest rate (and possibly on the availability of credit). Subsequently, 
aggregate demand affects inflation via the supply-side of an economy which is often 
described by a Phillips-curve relation. In this respect we follow the current mainstream in 
monetary macroeconomics according to which the money stock only plays a minor role in 
describing monetary policy effects (see Romer [2000] for an illustrative paper). Monetary 
policy is thus assumed to follow an interest rate policy rather than a money supply policy.  
 
The exchange rate channel can be divided into a direct and an indirect channel. The direct 
channel explains inflation fluctuations via the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to 
import prices, and hence on inflation. Indirectly, the real exchange rate affects the relative 
price between domestic and foreign goods, which in turn has an impact on both, domestic and 
foreign demand for domestic goods, and hence contributes to the aggregate demand channel 
for the transmission of monetary policy. 
 
Both channels can be summarized in the following simple model of an open economy: 
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(24)  t t t 1 t tE y q+π = δ π +α +β +ηt
tν
t
t
(25) . t t t 1 t ty E y r q+= − γ +µ +
 
The two relations incorporate the forward–looking behavior typical of the New Keynesian 
framework. Equation (24) is a forward-looking open economy Phillips curve. It can be 
derived from an optimization problem of an individual firm acting in a monopolistically 
competitive environment. Equation (24) is then a loglinear approximation about the steady 
state of the aggregation of the individual firm pricing decisions. Accordingly, the inflation 
rate πt is positively related to expected inflation, the output gap and the real exchange rate 
(see Guender [2001] for a derivation of the open economy version and Roberts [1995] for a 
general paper on New Keynesian Phillips curves). Equation (25) defines an open-economy IS 
relation. The output gap yt depends positively on its expected future value, negatively on the 
real interest rate rt and positively on the real exchange rate qt. Note that a rise in qt represents 
a real depreciation. Thus, the structural parameters α, β, γ, δ and µ are all positive. The supply 
shock  and the demand shock  are assumed to follow an AR(1) process tη tν
 
(26)  t t 1 ˆ−η = θη +η
(27)  t t 1 ˆ−ν = κν + ν
 
where θ  and  are the coefficients of autocorrelation. κ tηˆ  and tνˆ  are white noise 
disturbances.  
 
An additional feature of open economy models is the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition which describes the behavior of international financial markets participants: 
 
(28) . ft t t t 1 ti i E s s+= + − + ε t
+
1 1
 
If this condition is met, private market participants should be indifferent between the domestic 
and the foreign investment. Using the definition of the real exchange rate (variables for the 
foreign country are marked with the superscript f) 
 
(29)  ft t 1 t t t 1 t t t 1 t t 1E q q E s s E E+ + +− ≡ − + π − π
 
and the Fisher equation 
 
(30)  and t t t ti r E += + π f f ft t t ti r E += + π  
 
for the domestic and the foreign nominal interest rate we can express the UIP condition in real 
terms: 
 
(31) . ft t t t 1 tr r E q q+= + − + ε t
 
The risk premium shock and the foreign real interest rate are modeled as serially correlated 
disturbances: 
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(32)  t t 1 ˆ−ε = ρε + ε t
f
tr(33)  
f f
t t 1 ˆr r −= φ +
 
where ρ  and  are the coefficients of autocorrelation. φ tεˆ  and  are white noise disturbances. 
The complete model then exists of the behavioral equations (24), (25) and (31) as well as the 
AR(1) processes for the shocks (equations (26), (27), (32), and (33)). 
f
tˆr
 
If a central bank implements its monetary policy decisions with two operating targets it is 
useful to introduce a comprehensive measure of the actual policy stance of the central bank’s 
two operating targets. This is provided by the so-called Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) 
which can be defined in a simple form as follows: 
 
(34) . t tMCI r q= −ψ t
 
If the monetary policy stance is about to tighten, the MCI rises, and in the opposite case, the 
index falls. With a positive elasticity ψ , a tighter MCI can be achieved by raising the interest 
rate, by a real appreciation, or by a combination of both.10 The definition of the MCI in 
equation (34) corresponds to that by Ball [1999] (see also Chapter 0).  
 
For the monetary policy maker it is now crucial to know which MCI he has to realize. Thus, 
we first have to define the objective of the central bank. In the class of dynamic rational 
expectation models given by equations (24), (25) and (31) the central bank is typically 
assumed to follow an intertemporal loss function 
 
(35)  ( )y2 2t t t t
0
L E y
∞ τ
π +τ +τ
τ=
 = δ λ π + λ  ∑
 
which consists of the expected sum of discounted current and future period losses. δ denotes 
the discount factor ( 0 1< δ < ). The period loss function is assumed to be quadratic where λπ 
and λy are the preferences of the central bank with respect to the target variables π and y. The 
monetary policy problem is then to find an instrument path that minimizes the intertemporal 
loss subject to the structure and the state of the economy at all dates. It is convenient to 
summarize the model of the economy to the so-called state-space representation which can be 
written as 
 
(36)  
2
1,t 11,t 1 1,t
0 1 0 t
n 1t 2,t 1 2,t
xˆx x
A A B r
0E x x
++
×+
    = + +          
 
with as a (( Tf1,t t t t tx = η ν ε )r 1n 1× ) vector of predetermined variables with n1 = 4, 
 as a ( ) vector of forward looking variables with n( )Tt t tx y q= π 2n2,t 1× 2 = 3 and the 
instrument variable rt. The vector of white-noise disturbances 1,t 1xˆ +  to the predetermined 
                                                 
10 Note that a negative change in the real exchange rate is a real appreciation. Of course central banks are only 
able to directly control the nominal values of their operating targets it and st. But under the important 
assumption of price stickiness, rt and qt are perfectly correlated with their nominal counterparts it and st, the 
operating targets of the central bank. 
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variables is composed of . A( Tft t t tˆ ˆ ˆ rˆη ν ε ) 0, A1 and B0 are the matrices containing the 
structural coefficients. Thus, our model can be rewritten as 
t 1
t 1
t 1
f
t 1
t t 1
t t 1
t t 1
0 0 0
r0 0 0
E0 0
E y1 0
E q
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
η     ν     ε   =     πδ −        
 
(37) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
θ  κ  ρ φ −α −β − −µ − − 
t t
t t
t t
f f
tt t
t
t
t
ˆ0
ˆ0
ˆ0
ˆr .r 0 r
0 0
y 0
q 1 0
η η          ν ν         ε ε    + +        π    γ             

 
 
The solution to the problem of the monetary policy maker, i.e. the minimization of (35) 
subject to (37), can be found by applying some well-developed numerical algorithms, as 
described for example in Söderlind [1999]. For this reason, the model has to be calibrated. 
The parameters of our economy were set as follows: 1δ = , 0.4α =  and 0.3β =
πλ =
 in the Phillips 
curve,  and  in the IS relation. The autocorrelation coefficients of the shock 
processes are . The central bank is finally assumed to follow a strategy of 
flexible inflation targeting so that the preferences of the central bank are . The 
specification of the system is completed by setting all the variances of the white-noise shocks 
to unity, and all the covariance terms to zero. These parameters are well in line with the 
literature on monetary policy in small open economies (see the calibration in Ball [1999] and 
Dennis [2000]). 
0.8γ = 0.4µ =
κ = ρ = 0.6θ = φ =
y 1λ =
 
By using standard methods the optimal discretionary policy is calculated as a rule for the 
interest rate which is a linear function of the predetermined variables: 
 
(38) . t 1r Fx= ,t
 
Given this interest rate rule the reduced form (i.e. the dynamics) of the model can be written 
as 
 
(39)  1,t 1 1,t 1,t 1x Mx+ += + ε
(40) . 2,t 1,tx Nx=
 
For the calibrated model the relevant matrices are 
 
(41) , ( )F 0.1880 0.4772 0.6182 0.6182=
(42) , and 
0.6 0 0 0
0 0.6 0 0
M
0 0 0.6 0
0 0 0 0.6
   =     
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(43) . 
1.3014 0.5422 0.4338 0.4338
N 0.8459 0.3524 0.2819 0.2819
0.4700 1.1930 0.9544 0.9544
−  = − − −  − − 
 
The optimal interest rate rule under discretion can then be expressed as 
 
(44) ( )ft t t tr 0.1880 0.4772 0.6182 r= η + ν + ε + t . 
 
From (40) and (43) we can write the endogenous qt variable as  
 
(45) ( )ft t t tq 0.4700 1.1930 0.9544 r= − η − ν + ε + t
)
. 
 
Note that in this approach qt is not treated as an instrument. This is due to the fact that once 
the decision on the real interest rate path is made, the future evolution of qt is determined by 
(45). Thus, it cannot be viewed as an independent instrument. However, as we will see below, 
the crucial difference between independently floating exchange rates and managed floating is 
that under a managed float this path is only determined by domestic and foreign interest rates 
while under a independent float this path is subject to stochastic disturbances stemming from 
the international financial markets. And these are the disturbances which induce the central to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market (see the previous Chapter, equation (21)).11 
 
Solving (45) for (  and inserting it into (44) yields an alternative formulation of the 
optimal reaction function 
f
t trε +
 
(46) ( )t t t t t0.6182r 0.1880 0.4772 q 0.4700 1.19300.9544= η + ν + + η + tν
t
 
 
which can easily be solved for a linear combination of rt and qt, the Monetary Conditions 
Index (MCI): 
 
(47) . t t t tMCI r 0.6477q 0.4924 1.2500= − = η + ν
 
Equation (47) represents the internal equilibrium rule. It consists of two elements: 
 
• the optimum weighting of the real exchange rate in the MCI: 0.6477ψ = ; 
• the optimum response of the MCI to domestic shocks: t tMCI 0.4924 1.2500 t= η + ν . 
 
Thus, the MCI serves as combined measure of the monetary policy stance which has to be 
controlled and adjusted in response to changing macroeconomic conditions. As a simple rule 
the monetary policy stance has to become more restrictive if the domestic economy is affected 
by positive supply or demand shocks (the optimal MCI rises); in the opposite case, when the 
domestic economy is hit by negative shocks (the optimal MCI declines), the monetary policy 
                                                 
11 Of course equation (45) still contains εt as determinant of the real exchange rate path. This is because the 
internal equilibrium condition derived here equally applies to managed floating regimes and independently 
floating regimes. As we will show below, the extent to which managed floating is practiced is reflected in the 
degree of validity of UIP. 
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stance has to become more expansionary. The domestic constraint to monetary policy 
therefore is the strict observation of this rule, independently of the exchange rate regime 
chosen. A deviation from this rule leads to either an overheating or a recession of the 
domestic economy. 
 
Managed floating in action – similarities and differences to independently floating 
exchange rates 
The setting of the two operating targets within this framework can be demonstrated if we 
analyze four different shocks: a positive demand and an inflationary supply shock, a shock in 
the form of an increase of the foreign real interest rate and a UIP shock. The following 
Figures depict the impulse-response of the variables of interest over 12 periods. The shocks 
are assumed to hit the economy in period 1. To demonstrate the necessity of a policy reaction 
the left panel of ,  and  shows the development of inflation and 
output under the assumption of a constant real interest rate. The size of the shocks is one 
standard deviation. 
Figure 8
Figure 8
Figure 8: Demand shock 
Figure 10 Figure 12
 
 shows that a positive demand shock calls for a restrictive MCI. In an open economy 
framework this is mainly achieved by an increase of the domestic real interest rate. Since the 
foreign real interest rate has remained unchanged, UIP requires that the domestic currency is 
on a depreciation path (see Figure 9). This is realized by an immediate real appreciation of the 
domestic currency which exerts an additional degree of monetary restriction. 
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Figure 9: MCI and UIP with a demand shock 
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In the situation of an inflationary supply shock the model shows that also a (slight) tightening 
of monetary conditions is required (see ). Again, as the foreign interest rate has 
remained constant, an instantaneous appreciation is needed after which the domestic currency 
will depreciate in order to meet the UIP condition (see ).  
Figure 10
Figure 10: Supply shock 
Figure 11
Figure 11: MCI and UIP with supply shocks 
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In an open economy changes in the foreign interest rate can be also treated as a shock. Here 
we assume that the foreign interest rate is increased by one standard deviation. In order to 
insulate the domestic economy from this disturbance, monetary policy has to keep monetary 
conditions unchanged (see Figure 12). This can be reconciled with UIP if the domestic real 
interest rate is increased, but less than the foreign rate and if at the same time the exchange 
rate is depreciated instantaneously which compensates the restrictive demand effect of the 
higher interest rate. From its depreciated level the exchange rate can appreciate over time so 
that the interest differential in favor of the foreign currency is compensated (see ).  Figure 13
Figure 13: MCI and UIP with foreign interest rate shocks 
 
Figure 12: Foreign interest rate shocks 
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It is important to note that the interest rate and exchange rate response to these three shocks 
would also take place under a system of free floating as long as the UIP condition is perfectly 
met. UIP would keep the exchange rate automatically on the target paths delineated here. 
However, as already mentioned, the empirical evidence for UIP is extremely poor. Thus, the 
main attraction of managed floating is that it uses foreign exchange market intervention in 
order to keep the exchange rate on the UIP path. In other words, managed floating prevents or 
least reduces UIP shocks. This is demonstrated by ,  and  which 
compare the UIP for two independently floating countries (United Kingdom, New Zealand) 
and for two “managed floaters” (Peru and Slovenia). The results for the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand are taken from Hüfner [2002]. For the UIP estimations the following standard 
regression was carried out: 
Table 7 Figure 14 Figure 15
 
(48) ( )ft ,t 3M t,3M t,3M t,t 3Ms i i+ +∆ = α +β − + ε . 
 
For UIP to be valid, the parameter α has to equal zero, and the parameter β has to equal one. 
The 3-month ahead exchange rate changes refer to changes of the bilateral nominal exchange 
rate of the country under consideration against the US dollar, except for Slovenia which 
manages its parity against the German mark/the euro. The Peruvian nominal interest rate is 
the average rate offered by commercial banks on 31- to 179-day time deposits in national 
currency taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. The Slovenian interest 
rates are average commercial banks’ deposit rates with a maturity of 31 to 90 days taken from 
Bank of Slovenia’s monthly bulletin. The remaining nominal interest rates are treasury bill 
rates taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. The residuals of the 
estimations were all found to be stationary. 
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Again, one can see very clearly that UIP does not hold under independently floating rates. For 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand the “typical anomaly” of a negative β value can be 
detected. Moreover, in both cases, the βs become insignificant. In contrast to this, the 
estimated coefficients show that under managed floating a relatively solid evidence for UIP 
can be observed. In other words, the exchange rate policy in these cases has indeed 
contributed to exchange rate paths that were to some degree in line with UIP.  
 
Table 7: Empirical evidence for UIP 
 period α β R2 
United Kingdom 1993:1 – 2001:1 -0.003 (0.420) 
-0.775 
(-0.417) 0.003 
New Zealand 1993:1 – 2001:1 0.021 (1.550) 
-2.345 
(1.283) 0.031 
Slovenia 1993:1 – 2001:12 0.005 (1.616) 
0.461*** 
(4.976) 0.189 
Peru 1995:1 – 2001:12 -0.016 (-1.636) 
1.473*** 
(3.317) 0.118 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level; estimation method: OLS. 
 
Figure 14: UIP under independently floating exchange rates 
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Figure 15: UIP under managed floating exchange rates 
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Thus, the advantage of managed floating over independent floating can be demonstrated if we 
assume that a central bank is able to maintain perfect UIP by foreign exchange market 
intervention. As mentioned in Chapter 0 the budget constraint of foreign exchange reserves 
can prevent such a control if a currency is under the pressure of a depreciation. As a 
consequence the costs of independent floating consist in the social loss that is caused by UIP 
shocks. Figure 16 depicts the impact of UIP shocks on the goal variables π and y. It shows 
that even with optimum policy behavior (i.e. an increase in the real interest rate) deviations 
from the target values can be important. 
 
Figure 16: Consequences of UIP shocks under independently floating exchange rates 
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Figure 17 shows the policy frontiers for three variances of the UIP shock: [ ]t 0ε =Var  (the 
thin line), [ ]tVar 1ε =  (the medium line), and [ ]tVar 5ε =  (the thick line). The black squares 
indicate a central bank that equally weights the inflation rate and the output gap in its loss 
function. Thus, a perfect managed floating provides less output and inflation instability than 
pure float with UIP shocks. The lower panel of Figure 17 also shows that UIP shocks require 
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a high variance of the domestic interest rate which can conflict either with the stability of the 
domestic financial sector or with a zero-bound of nominal interest rates.  
 
Figure 17: Policy frontiers in the case of UIP shocks 
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Overcoming the inconsistency triangle through managed floating 
As already mentioned, the inconsistency triangle postulates that a country can only attain one 
side (i.e. one pair of attributes) of the triangle: capital controls, fixed exchange rates or pure 
floating. But it says nothing about the possibility of adopting some sort of intermediate 
regime. Frankel [1999] has mentioned this flaw of the current debate:  
 
“There is nothing in existing theory, for example, that prevents a country from pursuing 
a managed float in which half of every fluctuation in demand for its currency is 
accommodated by intervention and half is allowed to be reflected in the exchange rate.” 
(ibid., p. 7) 
 
Our discussion has shown that the solution to the inconsistency triangle is not a halfway house 
between half-stability and half-independence. Instead an integrated approach is required 
where the optimum interest rate level and the optimum exchange rate path are determined 
simultaneously. Thus, managed floating allows to convert the inconsistency triangle into a 
consistency triangle with the following three corners: capital mobility, an autonomously 
determined monetary conditions index and an exchange rate path which follows the interest 
rate differential and which can be controlled as long as the reserves are above a critical level 
(see Chapter 0). Above all, managed floating provides a comprehensive solution to the 
problem of capital inflows which many economists regard as an inherent flaw of intermediate 
regimes.  
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Figure 18: Consistency triangle 
capital mobility
m
on
eta
ry
 au
to
no
m
y
M
CI
t =
 M
CI
op
t
exchange rate path
UIP
 
Unresolved issues of managed floating 
While managed floating offers several important advantages compared with traditional 
exchange rate strategies, it is certainly not a panacea which could solve all problems of the 
international monetary order. The main weaknesses of this framework are the following: 
 
• As the central bank does not announce an exchange rate path, the exchange rate can no 
longer be used as an anchor for private sector expectations which is especially useful 
in the situation of a disinflation. 
• As a the control over the exchange rate is asymmetric, a central bank can lose the 
control over the macroeconomic situation if it is confronted with very strong capital 
outflows. 
• As each central bank or government decides autonomously over the exchange rate, 
there is a serious risk that managed floating is misused for a beggar-my-neighbor 
policy which can undermine the aims of the WTO. 
 
We will shortly discuss these three topics. 
 
In search of a new anchor for private sector expectations 
In the 1980s monetary targeting and exchange rate targeting were regarded as ideal devices 
for establishing a transparent and credible monetary framework in larger and smaller currency 
areas respectively. As far as monetary targeting is concerned, many central banks decided to 
substitute it by inflation targeting as a more comprehensive strategic approach (Bernanke et 
al. [1999], Bofinger [2001]). In same way, the EMS crises and the Asian crises have 
demonstrated that the conditions under which fixed nominal exchange rate pegs can be 
applied are very rare. In Bofinger and Wollmershäuser [2000] we have shown that the reason 
for the instability of such regimes is due to the difficulty to reconcile the dual requirement of 
internal and external equilibrium especially if the foreign interest rate is exceptionally low 
(US rates in the years 1971-73 and 1992-94) or high (German rates in 1992). 
 
While managed floating allows an insulation from such disturbance, by its very nature it 
cannot provide an anchor for private sector expectations. Thus, if managed floating is 
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regarded as an optimum solution in terms of achieving internal and external equilibrium, an 
additional institutional device is required. The most obvious solution is inflation targeting 
which provides an anchor for expectations by a public announcement of the inflation target 
that the central bank intends to achieve.  
 
There is nothing that prevents a combination of managed floating and inflation targeting. As 
demonstrated Ball [1999], inflation targeting in an open economy requires that the central 
bank sets monetary conditions in way that a given inflation target can be achieved. Managed 
floating provides a framework that allows to generate such monetary conditions in way that is 
compatible with external equilibrium. Schaechter et al. [2000] have shown there are already 
several emerging market countries that have adopted this approach: Brazil, Chile, the Czech 
Republic, Israel, Poland, and South Africa. All of them are now independent or managed 
floaters according to the IMF’s classification.  
 
The control over the exchange rate is asymmetric 
The most serious flaw of managed floating as we have described it here is the asymmetric 
control over the exchange rate: a central bank’s ability to avoid an unwanted depreciation is 
limited by the stock of its exchange reserves (and the availability of balance of payments 
credits). Thus, a central bank could always be confronted with a situation of a major crisis of 
confidence which forces it to accept a depreciation that exceeds its exchange rate target path 
by far. An example for such a crisis is the depreciation of the rupiah in 1997/98 from 2,500 
rupiah per US-dollar in July 1997 to over 15,000 rupiah per US-dollar in mid-July 1998. In 
the more recent past, Uruguay had to give its managed float because of very strong capital 
outflows.  
 
If a country loses control over the exchange rate it has to cope with a UIP shock. In order to 
maintain a given MCI, this would require a very strong increase of the interest rate. As the 
MCI is constructed under the assumption of a perfect substitutability of the interest rate and 
the exchange rate lever, such a policy switch would not be problematic. In reality, this 
substitutability is questionable, above all if the required degree of substitution is very high. 
While the exchange rate mainly affects the international sector of the economy (exporters and 
import substitution), the interest rate affects the whole economy. A policy shift leading to a 
strong real depreciation and a very high real interest rates implies an extremely restrictive 
impulse for the domestic sectors of the economy (the banking system because of its maturity 
transformation, the services and the construction sector, and the government which is often 
heavily indebted and often also in a foreign currency). As the Asian crisis has shown, such an 
overly restrictive effect on the domestic sectors of the economy can transform a currency 
crisis into a financial sector crisis.  
 
Thus, under managed floating countries remain vulnerable to crises of confidence which can 
be generated simply by contagion effects. Some IMF credit facilities (the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility and as a precautionary device the Contingent Credit Line) provide countries 
with financial resources that are not subject to the usual limits but are based on the actual 
financing needs. However, a surcharge of 300 up to 500 basis points is applied for such funds 
and the member country has to repay these credits within 2 ½ years at the very latest. Given 
the rather strict eligibility criteria for the CCL12 one could ask whether countries that are 
                                                 
12 See IMF [2000], p. 67: “(...) the eligibility criteria confine potential candidates for a CCL to those members 
implementing policies considered unlikely to give rise to a need to use IMF resources; whose economic 
performance— and progress in adhering to relevant internationally accepted standards—has been assessed 
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qualified for CCL could be completely or partially dispensed from the repayment of such 
credits if a clear contagion effect can be diagnosed.  
 
Managed floating and beggar-my-neighbor policies 
With the widespread practice of managed floating by IMF member countries the international 
monetary order has experienced a profound change. By its very nature managed floating 
implies unilaterally decided exchange rate policies that are not discussed in the public 
domain. This gives governments ample scope for exchange rate policies that are not only 
designed by macroeconomic considerations but also by trade-related aspects. Since exchange 
rate changes have similar effects as tariffs, managed floating makes it possible to circumvent 
the regulations of the WTO. 
 
The very fact that the foreign exchange reserves of developing countries have increased from 
330 billions of US-dollar in 1990 to 1,170 billions of US-dollar in 200013 shows that in the 
longer run exchange rate policies were dominated by the desire to keep the national currencies 
on an undervalued basis. The alarmingly high United States current account deficits reflects 
the risks for those countries which follow a unilateral policy of benign neglect in a world 
where most other countries have clear targets for their exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar. 
 
Thus, managed floating would require a comprehensive surveillance of national exchange rate 
policies by the International Monetary Fund or even by the WTO. Without a clear theoretical 
framework for managed floating and a “neutral” exchange rate policy it will be not easy to 
detect strategic exchange rate policies. We hope that the empirical methods and the theoretical 
considerations presented in this paper can provide a basis for such an approach. 
 
Managed floating and the Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
                                                                                                                                                        
Our analysis of managed floating has important implications for the exchange rate strategies 
of EU accession countries. It shows that the negative assessment of intermediate regimes 
which can be found in the papers by Buiter and Grafe [2002] and by Begg et al. [2001] is 
mainly due to a lack of a clear theoretical treatment. Above all, it becomes obvious that the 
capital inflow problem which plays an important role in the second paper is mainly 
attributable to a neglect of the UIP condition.  
 
As a consequence, it is no longer compelling to ask for Euroization as the only sensible 
strategy for EMU entry. If managed floating is regarded as a realistic alternative, one has 
whether such a regime is compatible with the Exchange Rate Mechanism II which is the 
prescribed institutional framework for all EMU entrants. From our analysis of managed 
floating it is of special interest in which the ERM II deals with the main flaws of this regime: 
the asymmetric control over the exchange rate and the potential for beggar-my-neighbor-
policies.  
 
Institutional set-up 
The Exchange Rate Mechanism II is a modified version of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of 
the original European Monetary System which started in March 1979. For the accession 
countries the ERM II plays an important role in their process to European monetary 
positively by the IMF in the latest Article IV consultation and thereafter; and which have constructive relations 
with private sector creditors with a view to facilitating appropriate private sector involvement.” 
13 These figures are taken from the IFS (line 1l s, country code 200). As they were listed in SDRs, we multiplied 
them by the average annual US-dollar/SDR exchange rate. 
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integration. According to Article 121 of the Treaty one of the four criteria of convergence 
required for EMU entry is 
 
“the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing 
against the currency of any other Member State.” 
 
In addition, the European Council in its resolution “on the establishment of an exchange-rate 
mechanism in the third stage of economic and monetary union” has declared:14 
 
“Participation in the exchange-rate mechanism will be voluntary for the Member States 
outside the euro area. Nevertheless, Member States with a derogation can be expected to 
join the mechanism. A Member State which does not participate from the outset in the 
exchange-rate mechanism may participate at a later date.” 
 
Thus, under present rules an accession country 
 
• cannot join the ERM II before EU membership,  
• may and is expected to join the ERM II after it has become an EU member,  
• must join the ERM II two years prior to its scheduled EMU entry.  
 
For an assessment of the status quo it seems useful to analyze in more detail the institutional 
framework provided by the ERM II and its contribution to the exchange rate policies of 
accession countries in relation to the euro. The most important elements of the ERM II are  
 
• the definition of central rates and fluctuation bands, 
• the rules for marginal and intramarginal interventions, 
• the provision of short-term financing facilities for interventions,  
• an exit option, especially for the ECB. 
 
Central rates and fluctuations bands 
According to the resolution of the Council an ERM II member country must define a central 
rate against the euro for its currency. Thus, the system is asymmetric by nature, since the ECB 
is not required to do the same for the euro vis-à-vis the currencies of ERM II members. This is 
one of the main differences between ERM II and ERM I where a formal symmetry prevailed. 
The parities were defined by a “parity grid”, i.e. a matrix of mutual parities. 
 
In line with the regulations for the ERM I since August 1993 the fluctuation band of the ERM 
II is ± 15 %. In the ERM I until July 1993 the “normal” fluctuation margin was ± 2.25 %; a 
wide band of ± 6 % was also possible, but it was only used by Italy.  
 
Because of the fixed parity one could argue that managed floating and ERM II are 
incompatible. However, as the Ecofin has stated this only applies to managed floating without 
a mutually agreed central rate.15 As Figure 19 shows, the exchange rate paths of all lead 
                                                 
14 Resolution from 16 June 1997 (97/C 236/03). 
15 See also ECOFIN [2001]: “The only clear incompatibilities with the ERM II that can be identified already at 
this stage are the cases of free floating (or managed floats without a mutually agreed central rate), crawling 
pegs, and pegs against anchors other than the euro.” 
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accession countries since 1999 could have been relatively easily surrounded by a ± 15 % band 
around a constant central rate.  
 
Figure 19: Exchange rates of the lead accession countries vis-à-vis the euro 
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Source: European Central Bank 
 
 
Thus, ERM II is very well suited for a policy of managed floating. First, the broad fluctuation 
margins provide a sufficient breathing space for exchange rate paths that are determined by 
interest rate differentials. Even if one assumes that a currency exhibits a interest differential of 
10 percentage points in relation the euro, it could be kept within the band at a constant central 
rate for three years: It would start in the first year at the ceiling of the band and gradually 
move towards to floor by the end of the third year. Additional flexibility is provided by the 
possibility of discretionary realignments. 
 
As far as parity adjustments are concerned, the resolution calls for a coordinated procedure: 
 
“Decisions on central rates and the standard fluctuation band shall be taken by mutual 
agreement of the ministers of the euro-area Member States, the ECB and the ministers 
and central bank governors of the non-euro area Member States participating in the new 
mechanism, following a common procedure involving the European Commission, and 
after consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee. The ministers and 
governors of the central banks of the Member States not participating in the exchange-
rate mechanism will take part but will not have the right to vote in the procedure.” 
 
This constitutes another positive feature of the ERM II since it removes one of the risk of an 
unilateral floating where an individual country could be always tempted to pursue a beggar-
my-neighbor-policy. This advantage of a coordinated exchange rate management increases 
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with the number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe participating in the ERM II. It is 
important to note that such an arrangement is mainly in the interest of the present EMU 
countries since it helps to prevent an exchange rate dumping by CEE countries.  
 
Rules for interventions 
In line with our assessment of foreign exchange markets the resolution explicitly addresses 
the problems of purely market-determined exchange rates:  
 
“the mechanism will also help to protect them (ERM II members; PB and TW) and the 
Member States adopting the euro from unwarranted pressures in the foreign-exchange 
markets. In such cases, it may assist Member States outside the euro area participating 
in it, when their currencies come under pressure, to combine appropriate policy 
responses, including interest-rate measures, with coordinated intervention.” 
 
The agreement which will be made between the ECB and possible ERM II members 
differentiates between marginal interventions, i.e. interventions which are required for 
preventing a breaching of the margins, and intramarginal interventions, i.e. interventions 
within the margins. The agreement stipulates: 
 
• “Intervention at the margins shall in principle be automatic and unlimited. However, 
the ECB and a ERM II central bank can suspend these interventions if they conflict 
with the objective of price stability”.  
• “The ECB and participating non-euro area NCBs (national central banks; PB and TW) 
may agree to co-ordinated intramarginal intervention.” 
 
It is obvious that the agreement is still very much shaped by the arrangements of the original 
ERM I with its narrow ± 2.25 % margins. In this system shocks very rapidly forced a currency 
to the limits of the band so that marginal intervention took place rather often and had to be a 
very effective tool. Nevertheless, intramarginal interventions also played an important role in 
the original ERM but they were never given an equal treatment with marginal interventions.16  
 
This subordinate role of intramarginal interventions makes is a clear disadvantage for 
countries that want to pursue managed floating within the ERM II. In this case intramarginal 
interventions are certainly more important than marginal interventions which only come into 
play if intramarginal interventions were insufficient in stopping a speculative attack. Thus, 
under managed floating  
 
• intramarginal interventions are required for the management of the exchange rate from 
day to day, while 
• marginal interventions provide a safety net which under an effective exchange rate 
management will not be used.  
 
In other words, the importance of the different forms of interventions is completely different 
under managed floating within the ERM II than under the narrow bands of the original ERM.  
 
                                                 
16 A limited access for such interventions was made possible with the Basle-Nyborg agreement of 1987.  
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Financing of interventions (“Very short-term financing facility”)  
Compared with a unilateral managed floating, ERM II membership would provide the CEE 
countries access to the “very short-term financing facility” (VSTF) of the ERM II. The ECB’s 
preferential treatment of marginal interventions is also mirrored in the regulations for the 
financing of interventions:  
 
• In the case of marginal interventions the VSTF is “in principle automatically available 
and unlimited in amount”.  
• For intramarginal interventions, the VSTF can also be used but it requires an 
agreement of the ECB and the cumulative amount made available for such 
interventions is limited to a ceiling which is laid down for each ERM II member 
country. In addition it is expected that the debtor central bank makes “appropriate use” 
of its own reserves.  
 
As the asymmetry of the reserve constraint is one of the main difficulties of a strategy of 
managed floating, the provision of additional funds is certainly very helpful. However, in the 
case of intramarginal interventions the ceilings laid down by the agreement are relatively 
strict. E.g. Denmark could obtain a maximum of 520 million euro. If one relates the ceilings 
to a country’s GDP, e.g. Poland would qualify for about 450 million euro. Compared with 
Poland’s foreign exchange reserves totaling about 25 billion dollar, the additional leeway 
provided by the VSTF is extremely limited.  
 
In both cases the maturity of the credits is indeed very short-term. The unlimited facilities for 
marginal interventions have to be repaid after three months. They can be automatically 
renewed once, but this is also limited to the narrow ceilings of the agreement. Thus, for 
defending a currency a against a strong speculative attack, the whole financing mechanism is 
not very effective. This became obvious in the ERM crises of 1992/93 when France had to 
give up the ± 2.25 % margin in August 1993 although its macroeconomic fundamentals were 
not worse than those of Germany.  
 
The exit option 
In the view of the Bundesbank, one of the main flaws of the ERM I was the lack of a clearly 
defined exit option for the central bank with a strong currency.17 This concern was taken up by 
the authors of the Council resolution: 
 
“However, the ECB and the central banks of the other participants could suspend 
intervention if this were to conflict with their primary objective. In their decision they 
would take due account of all relevant factors and in particular of the need to maintain 
price stability and the credible functioning of the exchange-rate mechanism.” 
 
Such a regulation would certainly have been helpful for the Bundesbank in the ERM I where 
it was confronted with up to nine central banks, some of them of almost similar size. In the 
case of the ECB and its relations with CEE countries such a safeguard clause seems no longer 
appropriate. It is difficult to image that even strong interventions for Poland, as the largest 
CEE economy, but with a GDP and a monetary base of only 3½ % of the present euro area, 
could directly threaten the ECB’s attempts to maintain price stability.  
                                                 
17 Otmar Emminger (the Bundesbank’s president in the period from 1977-79) in November 1978 wrote a letter to 
the German Government in which he declared that the Bundesbank would make use of an opting-out in the 
case of interventions threatening monetary stability in Germany (see Emminger [1986]).  
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In the relationship between a hegemonic ECB and its satellites in the CEE the main risk is that 
a certain ERM II country is pursuing a non-stability oriented fiscal and monetary policy 
which causes a strong depreciation of its currency, but which only in the longer run, if at all, 
could impair price stability of the whole currency area. As in this case interventions by itself 
would not be the right therapy, it would be helpful if the ECB could suspend interventions 
from the very outset. A simple framework for a modified exit option could be based on the 
“broad guidelines” laid down in Article 99 of the Treaty which were not available when the 
original ERM was established. In the context of an ERM II exit option the following two 
paragraphs would be especially important:  
 
Paragraph 3: “In order to ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained 
convergence of the economic performances of the Member States, the Council shall (...) 
regularly carry out an overall assessment.” 
 
Paragraph 4: “Where it is established (...) that the economic policies of a Member State 
are not consistent with the broad guidelines (...) or that they risk jeopardising the proper 
functioning of economic and monetary union, the Council may (...) make the necessary 
recommendations to the Member State concerned.”  
 
Thus, an exit option could be designed in a way that a country automatically looses the access 
to the VSTF if the Council decides according to paragraph 4 that its policies are no longer 
compatible with the broad guidelines. 
 
Overall assessment 
While the rules for central rates and the fluctuations band are well designed for a policy of 
managed floating, the rules for interventions, the VSTF and the exit option are still very much 
shaped by the situation of the old ERM with its narrow bands and a Bundesbank which had to 
safeguard its dominance vis-à-vis relatively large member countries. As a result, the 
additional funds made available under the VSTF are very limited so that under the status quo 
ERM II membership provides relatively small advantages for an accession country.  
 
Therefore, it seems useful to reconsider the whole ERM II framework. In our view, it would 
be possible to modify the Council resolution as well as the ECB agreement in a way that 
 
• it really supports the stability-oriented accession countries on their way to EMU 
• without jeopardizing price stability in the euro area.  
 
This requires above all, that a much stronger role is assigned to intramarginal interventions. 
First, it would be necessary to stipulate in article 4 of the agreement that an ERM II member 
country has a general permission to undertake intramarginal interventions at its own 
discretion. This would reflect the fact that under managed floating the exchange rate and the 
interest rate policy are integral elements of autonomous national monetary policy. If an ECB 
agreement is always required for intramarginal interventions, this could interfere with an 
effective national monetary policy and it could blur monetary policy responsibilities.  
 
Second, in order to support a smooth exchange rate policy of accession countries, the ceilings 
of the VSTF would have to be increased considerably. The example of Denmark shows that 
the amounts have been kept constant in nominal terms since 1979 which explains their very 
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small size compared to present levels of foreign exchange reserves. For Table 8 we assume 
that the ceilings would be about 20 times the size of the present agreement so that Poland 
would be entitled to an amount of 10 billion euro. The ceilings for the other countries were 
calculated according to the nominal GDP. For all accession countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe this would lead to an aggregate ceiling of about 23 billion euro.  
 
Table 8: Ceilings in an enhanced VSTF (=20 times the ceilings under the current VSTF) 
Country GDP (€ billion) Ceiling (€ billion) 
Bulgaria 13.0 0.8 
Czech Republic 55.0 3.2 
Estonia 5.5 0.3 
Hungary 49.5 2.9 
Latvia 7.7 0.5 
Lithuania 12.2 0.7 
Poland 171.0 10.0 
Romania 40.0 2.3 
Slovak Republic 20.9 1.2 
Slovenia 19.5 1.1 
Sum  23.1 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, own calculations 
 
A comparison of the aggregate ceiling with the amount of refinance credits provided by ECB 
which total about 200 billion demonstrates that such an extended VSTF would not constitute a 
problem for the ECB’s monetary policy management. In any case, the situation would be 
much less difficult than for the Bundesbank in 1979, when it was confronted with an 
aggregate ceiling (of the other EU members) of 16.5 billion ECU compared with a monetary 
base of 57 billion ECU.  
 
Such a modification of VSTF would not only be in the interest of the accession countries it 
could also be helpful for the present EMU members. By transforming ERM II from a waiting 
room into a business class lounge, accession countries would join sooner than under present 
conditions. As already mentioned this has the advantage that a mutual agreement on parities 
and realignments is required which prevents the old members against an exchange rate 
dumping by the newcomers. In addition, if the access to a much more generous VSTF is made 
dependent on the observance of the “broad policy guidelines”, it additionally creates a very 
strong incentive for national policy makers to adhere to these guidelines which fosters 
macroeconomic stability in the whole European Union. 
 
A pre-accession ERM II 
Given these advantages of a modified ERM II the question arises whether it would be 
adequate to open it also to countries which are in the accession stage. Under legal aspects 
such an opening would be not too difficult since in the tradition of the original EMS and ERM 
the whole ERM II has be designed outside the EU Treaty. As already mentioned it simply 
rests on a resolution by the Council and on an agreement between the ECB and national 
central banks. Both legal documents could be easily amended and modified permitting an 
ERM II membership already to accession countries.  
 
Of course, such an opening of the ERM II would require an enhanced surveillance of national 
economic policies by the EU. Along the lines already mentioned, one could envisage that 
“broad policy guidelines” are formulated already for accession countries. If the access to 
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ERM II is made contingent upon meeting the guidelines, national governments would have a 
very strong inventive to pursue stability-oriented economic policies at the macroeconomic and 
the microeconomic level.  
 
 
Conclusion 
After the experience with the currency crises of the 1990s, a broad consensus has emerged 
among economists that such shocks can only be avoided and capital mobility be maintained if 
countries adopt either purely floating exchange rates or very hard pegs (currency boards, 
dollarization). As a consequence of this view which has been enshrined in the so-
inconsistency triangle (or “unholy trinity”) all intermediate currency regimes are now 
regarded as inherently unstable. As far as economic theory is concerned, this view has the 
attractive feature that it not only fits nicely with the logic of the traditional Mundell-Fleming 
model but also that for both corner solutions (flexible exchange rates with a domestically 
oriented interest rate policy; hard pegs with a completely exchange rate oriented monetary 
policy) solid theoretical frameworks have been developed. Finally the IMF’s statistics seem to 
confirm that indeed intermediate regimes are less and less in fashion by both industrial 
countries and emerging market economies.  
 
However, in the last few years an anomaly has been detected which seriously challenges this 
new paradigm on exchange rate regimes. In their influential cross-country studies, Calvo and 
Reinhart [2000] and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2002] have shown that many of those 
countries which had declared themselves as “independent floaters” in the IMF statistics were 
indeed heavily intervening on foreign exchange markets. Thus, in most cases “floating” 
means “managed floating”.  
 
This insight and the lack of literature about “managed floating” was the starting point for our 
study. We first developed a set of indicators that allows us to differentiate further between 
three forms of floating: 
 
• Pure floaters completely refrain from foreign exchange market intervention. 
• Independent floaters intervene in order to smoothen short-term swings in exchange 
rates but they allow the market to determine the path of the external value of their 
currency.  
• Managed floaters are characterized by the fact that the central bank tries to control the 
exchange rate path by sterilized intervention.  
 
Our empirical analysis which extends and refines the Calvo/Reinhart approach comes to the 
result that many developed and emerging market economies can be regarded as managed 
floaters. In other words, the international monetary order is currently dominated by managed 
floating. This has important implications for economic theory and economic policy. As far as 
theory is concerned, managed floating is different from the textbook versions of both fixed 
and flexible exchange rates. 
 
• Compared with flexible exchange rates (or pure floating) the central intervenes 
sometimes very often and also with high quantities on the foreign exchange market in 
order to target a path for the exchange rate. 
• Compared with fixed exchange rates (or also crawling pegs) the central bank does not 
announce its target path. In other words, there is no pre-commitment in the exchange 
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rate policy. Instead of such a rule-based approach, a completely discretionary 
exchange rate management is adopted. 
 
Thus, managed floating can no longer be explained with the Mundell-Flemig model (above all 
because it is a comparative static model) nor with standard theories of fixed exchange rates or 
flexible exchange rates (including the more refined models of open economy inflation 
targeting). Therefore, we have tried to develop a simple theoretical framework for managed 
floating. At the level of a central bank’s operating targets it is based on the assumption that to 
some extent a simultaneous targeting of the nominal short-term interest rate and the nominal 
exchange rate is possible. Since the latter is rather controversial, above all because of the 
literature on sterilized interventions, we have shown in detail under which conditions a 
targeting of the exchange rate is possible. This is the case above all, if  
 
• the currency is under a pressure of strong inflows, i.e. it is appreciating by more than a 
target rate set by the central bank; 
• the central bank disposes over a large sterilization potential;  
• the costs of intervention are low; this is the case if the target path for the exchange rate 
is compatible with the interest rate differential. 
 
In the next step we develop a monetary and exchange rate policy framework which is 
grounded on the general logic of the Mundell-Fleming, but which neglects fiscal policy. It is 
based on the assumption that the two levers of a central bank (exchange rate, interest rate) 
have to be so as to fulfill internal and external equilibrium simultaneously: 
 
• As for the internal equilibrium, both operating targets have to be set in a way that 
minimizes a typical loss function of a central bank. We use an MCI as a combined 
measure of the actual monetary policy stance that results from both, the real interest 
rate and the real exchange rate.18 More precisely, we define the internal equilibrium 
condition as an MCI rule which we derive in accordance with a real interest rate rule 
for a closed economy. In other words, internal equilibrium requires that the short-
interest rate and the exchange rate path are set in way that an optimum MCI is 
realized.  
• As for the external equilibrium, the exchange rate path and the interest rate have to be 
set in a way that they correspond with the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the anchor 
currency. This avoids short-term profit opportunities of international investors and 
thus helps to prevent speculative inflows (which can often turn into outflows). At 
same time this rule keeps the cost of sterilization as low as possible. 
 
With a simple New-Keynesian model we show how the two operating targets have to be 
adjusted if the economy is affect by different shocks (demand shock, supply shock, foreign 
interest rate shock). It becomes obvious that the adjustment of the two operating targets is 
identical under managed floating and under pure floating. Thus, the main difference between 
these two approaches are UIP shocks. Due to the dismal empirical performance of UIP it is 
obvious that such shocks can be very large. Under a regime of pure floating a UIP shock has a 
negative effect on the central bank’s target variables and thus causes a social loss. This can be 
avoided under managed floating as long as the central bank is able to keep the exchange rate 
on a path determined by the interest rate differential. As a consequence, the efficiency line 
                                                 
18 As we assume sticky prices in the short-run, we assume that the real exchange rate and the real interest rate 
can be perfectly controlled by the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate 
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under managed floating is superior to the efficiency line under pure floating. Thus, managed 
floating offers a free lunch by using the additional degree of freedom that is provided by 
sterilized interventions. 
 
We also discuss several unresolved issues of managed floating. First, as the central bank does 
not announce an exchange rate path, the exchange rate can no longer be used as an anchor for 
private sector expectations. Thus, in the same way as the abandonment of rules for the money 
supply has paved the way for inflation targeting, a discretionary approach towards exchange 
rate targeting could also be accompanied with a switch to inflation targeting. In fact, same of 
the countries which manage their exchange rate have already introduced inflation targeting. 
Second, as a the control over the exchange rate is asymmetric, a central bank can lose the 
control over the macroeconomic situation if it is confronted with very strong capital outflows. 
This shows that managed floating is not a complete substitute for international co-operation in 
exchange rate policy. The contingent credit line of the IMF can be regarded as an important 
step into this direction. Third, as each central bank or government decides autonomously over 
the exchange rate, there is a serious risk that managed floating is misused for a beggar-my-
neighbor policy which can undermine the aims of the WTO. The very strong increase in the 
foreign exchange reserves of developing countries in the 1990s is a strong indication that such 
incentives are rather strong. At the same time the growing current account surplus of the 
United States shows the negative consequences for those countries that follow a completely 
passive exchange rate policy in an environment that is dominated by managed floating. Thus, 
managed floating is also not a prefect substitute for international coordination of exchange 
rate polices. On contrary, it makes this even more urgent than fixed rates or purely flexible 
rates.  
 
Finally, we discuss managed floating as a strategy for the EMU entry of countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. For that purpose we analyze the main rules of the ERM II which provides 
the institutional framework for this transition. We show that in its present form ERM II would 
allow enough flexibility to pursue a policy of managed floating. However, the intervention 
and credit facilities of ERM II which originally were designed for ERM I with its narrow ± 
2.25 % band are of little help for a central bank that tries to follow a policy of managed 
floating. There is very limited financial support for such interventions. In addition, they also 
require the ECB’s approval. In order to make this intermediate regime more attractive, the 
ECB should consider a significant increase of the individual credit facilities in general and 
above all for intramarginal interventions. While this would not impair the ECB’s internal 
monetary management, such a reform could have the advantage that Euroization is no longer 
regarded as the only viable option.  
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Appendix 1: Country coverage  
Table 9: IMF exchange rate classification of developed and emerging market economies 
Country Period IMF data availability Country Period IMF 
data 
availability 
Argentina 10/78 - 12/90 if  Mexico 3 12/94 - 11/00 if 12/94 - 09/00
Australia 1 07/82 - 11/83 mf  Morocco 09/80 - 03/90 mf  
Australia 2 12/83 - 11/00 if  New Zealand 04/85 - 11/00 if 04/85 - 10/00
Brazil 1 03/90 - 09/94 if  Nigeria 1 07/82 - 08/86 mf  
Brazil 2 10/94 - 09/98 mf  Nigeria 2 09/86 - 12/93 if  
Brazil 3 01/99 - 11/00 if  Nigeria 3 03/98 - 11/00 mf not available 
Bulgaria 02/91 - 06/97 if 06/94 - 06/97 Norway 1 12/92 - 06/95 if  
Canada 01/75 - 11/00 if  Norway 2 09/95 - 11/00 mf  
Chile 1 09/82 - 06/99 mf  Pakistan 02/82 - 09/99 mf 02/82 - 04/99
Chile 2 09/99 - 11/00 if  Peru 06/90 - 11/00 if  
Colombia 1 01/75 - 06/99 mf  Philippines 1 10/78 - 12/84 mf  
Colombia 2 09/99 - 11/00 if  Philippines 2 12/84 - 11/00 if 12/84 - 10/00
Czech Republic 06/97 - 11/00 mf 06/97 - 10/00 Poland 1 12/91 - 09/98 mf  
Ecuador 1 03/89 - 11/95 mf  Poland 2 04/00 - 11/00 if  
Ecuador 2 12/95 - 01/99 mf  Portugal 01/75 - 03/92 mf  
Ecuador 3 04/99 - 01/00 if  Russia 1 07/92 - 06/95 if not available 
Egypt 06/87 - 09/98 mf  Russia 2 07/95 - 12/97 mf  
Finland 09/92 - 09/96 if  Russia 3 09/99 - 11/00 if  
Greece 1 12/82 - 12/95 mf  Singapore 12/87 - 11/00 mf  
Greece 2 01/96 - 12/97 mf  Slovenia 06/93 - 11/00 mf  
Hungary 06/95 - 08/00 mf 06/95 - 08/00 South Africa 01/83 - 11/00 if  
India 1 02/79 - 02/93 mf  Spain 07/82 - 12/87 mf  
India 2 03/93 - 11/00 if  Sri Lanka 10/78 - 11/00 mf 10/78 - 10/00
Indonesia 1 05/83 - 06/97 mf  Sweden 12/92 - 11/00 if  
Indonesia 2 09/97 - 11/00 if 09/97 - 04/00 Switzerland 04/79 - 11/00 if 04/79 - 10/00
Israel 1 03/84 - 03/87 mf  Thailand 1 06/97 - 03/98 mf  
Israel 2 12/91 - 11/00 mf 12/91 - 09/00 Thailand 2 03/98 - 11/00 if  
Italy 09/92 - 09/96 if  Turkey 01/80 - 11/00 mf 01/80 - 09/00
Japan 01/75 - 11/00 if  United Kingdom 1 01/75 - 09/90 if  
Korea 1 03/80 - 10/97 mf  United Kingdom 2 09/92 - 11/00 if 09/92 - 09/00
Korea 2 12/97 - 11/00 if  United States 01/75 - 11/00 if  
Malaysia 06/93 - 03/98 mf  Venezuela 1 03/89 - 03/93 if  
Mexico 1 02/83 - 10/91 mf  Venezuela 2 06/93 - 06/94 mf  
Mexico 2 11/91 - 11/94 mf  Venezuela 3 06/96 - 11/00 mf 06/96 - 08/00
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Table 10: Number of observations 
 n = 6 n = 12  n = 6 n = 12 
normalization method 1 2 1 2 normalization method 1 2 1 2 
Argentina 142 142 136 136 Mexico 2 37 37 37 37 
Australia 1 12 12 6 6 Mexico 3 65 67 59 61 
Australia 2 199 199 193 193 Morocco 109 109 103 103 
Brazil 1 50 50 44 44 New Zealand 182 182 176 176 
Brazil 2 46 46 40 40 Nigeria 2 82 82 76 76 
Brazil 3 18 18 11 11 Nigeria 3 46 46 40 40 
Bulgaria 13 32 7 26 Norway 1 26 26 20 20 
Canada 311 311 311 311 Norway 2 58 58 52 52 
Chile 1 197 197 191 191 Pakistan 202 202 196 196 
Chile 2 10 10 4 4 Peru 121 121 115 115 
Colombia 1 294 294 294 294 Philippines 1 70 70 64 64 
Colombia 2 10 10 4 4 Philippines 2 186 187 180 181 
Czech Republic 36 36 30 30 Poland 1 89 89 83 83 
Ecuador 1 76 76 70 70 Poland 2 3 3 0 0 
Ecuador 2 38 38 38 38 Portugal 207 207 207 207 
Ecuador 3 5 5 0 0 Russia 2 25 25 19 19 
Egypt 131 131 125 125 Russia 3 10 10 4 4 
Finland 44 44 38 38 Singapore 151 151 145 145 
Greece 1 152 152 146 146 Slovenia 85 85 79 79 
Greece 2 24 24 24 24 South Africa 210 210 204 204 
Hungary 58 58 52 52 Spain 60 60 54 54 
India 1 164 164 158 158 Sri Lanka 260 260 254 254 
India 2 88 88 82 82 Sweden 91 91 85 85 
Indonesia 1 165 165 159 159 Switzerland 254 254 248 248 
Indonesia 2 27 34 21 28 Thailand 1 6 6 0 0 
Israel 1 32 32 26 26 Thailand 2 28 28 22 22 
Israel 2 101 101 95 95 Turkey 244 244 238 238 
Italy 44 44 38 38 United Kingdom 1 189 189 189 189 
Japan 311 311 311 311 United Kingdom 2 92 92 86 86 
Korea 1 207 207 201 201 United States 311 311 311 311 
Korea 2 31 31 25 25 Venezuela 1 44 44 38 38 
Malaysia 53 53 47 47 Venezuela 2 8 8 2 2 
Mexico 1 100 100 94 94 46 46 40 40 Venezuela 3 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Probability distributions 
Table 11: Probability distribution of Sabs1(6)  
 S≤0.5 S≤1.0 S≤1.5 S≤2.0  S≤0.5 S≤1.0 S≤1.5 S≤2.0 
United States 99.04 100.00 100.00 100.00 India 1 3.05 17.07 57.32 85.98 
United Kingdom 2 89.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 Ecuador 2 2.63 26.32 57.89 84.21 
Canada 73.63 100.00 100.00 100.00 Colombia 1 2.38 23.47 42.52 62.93 
Poland 2 33.33 100.00 100.00 100.00 Switzerland 1.97 17.32 39.37 62.99 
United Kingdom 1 64.02 84.66 95.24 98.94 Spain 1.67 33.33 75.00 91.67 
Japan 60.45 86.50 96.78 100.00 New Zealand 1.65 32.97 56.04 71.43 
Colombia 2 60.00 60.00 100.00 100.00 Chile 1 1.52 15.23 40.10 70.05 
South Africa 50.00 93.81 100.00 100.00 Philippines 1 1.43 40.00 74.29 94.29 
Korea 1 49.76 93.72 100.00 100.00 Philippines 2 0.54 29.57 63.44 80.65 
Singapore 40.40 88.08 100.00 100.00 Pakistan 0.50 26.73 51.98 79.70 
Mexico 3 32.31 86.15 89.23 93.85 Portugal 0.48 30.43 71.50 90.82 
Malaysia 28.30 54.72 64.15 79.25 Chile 2 0.00 30.00 100.00 100.00
Australia 2 28.14 71.36 87.94 94.47 Hungary 0.00 29.31 56.90 77.59 
Indonesia 1 26.06 73.94 86.06 95.76 Venezuela 2 0.00 25.00 37.50 62.50 
Slovenia 22.35 76.47 94.12 100.00 Russia 2 0.00 24.00 56.00 96.00 
Czech Republic 16.67 80.56 100.00 100.00 Mexico 1 0.00 24.00 49.00 69.00 
Egypt 16.03 25.19 33.59 41.98 Finland 0.00 22.73 50.00 72.73 
Bulgaria 15.38 53.85 69.23 76.92 Israel 2 0.00 18.81 43.56 83.17 
Indonesia 2 14.81 29.63 40.74 62.96 India 2 0.00 18.18 56.82 84.09 
Thailand 2 14.29 53.57 96.43 100.00 Australia 1 0.00 16.67 50.00 91.67 
Italy 13.64 79.55 100.00 100.00 Peru 0.00 13.22 38.84 61.98 
Israel 1 12.50 25.00 37.50 62.50 Nigeria 2 0.00 12.20 30.49 57.32 
Norway 1 11.54 30.77 46.15 65.38 Venezuela 1 0.00 11.36 34.09 45.45 
Greece 1 11.18 24.34 39.47 59.21 Norway 2 0.00 6.90 46.55 63.79 
Sri Lanka 10.77 58.46 80.77 93.85 Ecuador 1 0.00 6.58 21.05 44.74 
Russia 3 10.00 30.00 80.00 100.00 Venezuela 3 0.00 6.52 13.04 32.61 
Mexico 2 8.11 32.43 54.05 64.86 Argentina 0.00 2.11 6.34 12.68 
Poland 1 6.74 40.45 87.64 97.75 Brazil 1 0.00 0.00 14.00 44.00 
Sweden 6.59 48.35 78.02 94.51 Brazil 3 0.00 0.00 11.11 11.11 
Nigeria 3 6.52 50.00 80.43 93.48 Brazil 2 0.00 0.00 10.87 23.91 
Turkey 3.69 25.82 60.25 80.33 Ecuador 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 
Morocco 3.67 58.72 75.23 88.07 Greece 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Korea 2 3.23 54.84 70.97 83.87 Thailand 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 12: Probability distribution of Sabs1(12)  
 S≤0.5 S≤1.0 S≤1.5 S≤2.0  S≤0.5 S≤1.0 S≤1.5 S≤2.0 
United States 85.53 100.00 100.00 100.00 Colombia 1 0.00 0.00 4.76 15.65 
United Kingdom 2 62.79 100.00 100.00 100.00 Pakistan 0.00 0.00 4.59 22.45 
Japan 27.65 60.13 73.95 85.53 Israel 2 0.00 0.00 3.16 10.53 
United Kingdom 1 20.63 59.79 76.72 87.30 Philippines 1 0.00 0.00 3.13 21.88 
Canada 18.33 74.92 98.71 100.00 Portugal 0.00 0.00 2.90 20.77 
South Africa 4.41 41.18 86.27 99.02 India 1 0.00 0.00 1.90 10.76 
Korea 1 2.99 48.76 82.59 96.52 Chile 1 0.00 0.00 0.52 8.38 
Egypt 2.40 15.20 21.60 22.40 Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 
Indonesia 1 1.89 22.64 51.57 68.55 Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.37 
Mexico 3 1.69 28.81 84.75 86.44 Philippines 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.89 
Australia 2 1.04 18.13 56.48 76.68 Mexico 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.64 
Singapore 0.00 37.24 66.90 88.97 Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.53 
Malaysia 0.00 17.02 46.81 59.57 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.65 
Slovenia 0.00 7.59 45.56 77.21 Nigeria 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26 
Greece 1 0.00 7.53 17.81 18.49 Russia 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26 
Sri Lanka 0.00 3.54 25.59 50.79 India 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.88 
Sweden 0.00 2.35 21.18 34.12 Peru 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.48 
Morocco 0.00 0.97 34.95 55.34 Venezuela 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.63 
Korea 2 0.00 0.00 32.00 56.00 Australia 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 30.00 100.00 Norway 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Colombia 2 0.00 0.00 25.00 100.00 Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.00 0.00 23.68 89.47 Brazil 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nigeria 3 0.00 0.00 20.00 37.50 Brazil 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecuador 2 0.00 0.00 18.42 23.68 Chile 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poland 1 0.00 0.00 15.66 40.96 Russia 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 14.29 42.86 Brazil 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Thailand 2 0.00 0.00 13.64 77.27 Ecuador 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indonesia 2 0.00 0.00 9.52 19.05 Greece 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkey 0.00 0.00 7.14 24.37 Israel 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mexico 2 0.00 0.00 5.41 21.62 Venezuela 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 5.11 23.86 Venezuela 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Norway 1 0.00 0.00 5.00 30.00      
 
 57
Table 13: Probability distribution of Ifloat1(6)  
 I - I 0 I + rank result IMF  I - I 0 I + rank result IMF
Thailand 1 (*) 16.67 83.33 0.00 1 if mf Chile 1 25.89 35.03 39.09 32 mf mf 
Switzerland 15.35 71.26 13.39 2 if if Philippines 2 28.49 34.95 36.56 33 mf if 
Morocco 16.51 65.14 18.35 3 if mf Greece 1 27.63 34.21 38.16 34 mf mf 
Ecuador 1 18.42 59.21 22.37 4 if mf Israel 2 34.65 33.66 31.68 35 mf mf 
Mexico 3 21.54 50.77 27.69 5 if if Australia 2 41.21 33.17 25.63 36 mf if 
Italy 20.45 50.00 29.55 6 if if Argentina 38.03 33.10 28.87 37 mf if 
Philippines 1 45.71 50.00 4.29 7 if mf Sri Lanka 43.46 32.69 23.85 38 mf mf 
Turkey 22.54 48.77 28.69 8 mf mf Bulgaria 38.46 30.77 30.77 39 mf if 
Sweden 39.56 48.35 12.09 9 mf if Peru 20.66 30.58 48.76 40 mf if 
Nigeria 3 26.09 47.83 26.09 10 mf mf Spain 20.00 30.00 50.00 41 mf mf 
Slovenia 18.82 47.06 34.12 11 mf mf Poland 1 25.84 29.21 44.94 42 mf mf 
New Zealand 29.12 46.70 24.18 12 mf if UK 1 46.03 28.04 25.93 43 mf if 
Norway 2 34.48 46.55 18.97 13 mf mf India 2 25.00 27.27 47.73 44 mf if 
Nigeria 2 24.39 45.12 30.49 14 mf if Finland 50.00 27.27 22.73 45 mf if 
Ecuador 2 44.74 44.74 10.53 15 mf mf Colombia 1 38.44 26.19 35.37 46 mf mf 
Brazil 3 33.33 44.44 22.22 16 mf if Egypt 29.01 25.95 45.04 47 mf mf 
Russia 2 20.00 44.00 36.00 17 mf mf Singapore 34.44 25.17 40.40 48 mf mf 
Greece 2 33.33 41.67 25.00 18 mf mf Venezuela 2 (*) 50.00 25.00 25.00 49 mf mf 
South Africa 24.29 41.43 34.29 19 mf if Mexico 1 29.00 24.00 47.00 50 mf mf 
Pakistan 32.18 40.59 27.23 20 mf mf Brazil 2 39.13 23.91 36.96 51 mf mf 
Mexico 2 35.14 40.54 24.32 21 mf mf Israel 1 37.50 21.88 40.63 52 mf mf 
Korea 1 28.02 40.10 31.88 22 mf mf Japan 29.26 21.86 48.87 53 mf if 
Colombia 2 (*) 50.00 40.00 10.00 23 mf if Venezuela 1 25.00 20.45 54.55 54 mf if 
Hungary 43.10 39.66 17.24 24 mf mf Australia 1 (*) 0.00 16.67 83.33 55 mf mf 
Czech Republic 38.89 38.89 22.22 25 mf mf Korea 2 9.68 16.13 74.19 56 mf if 
Norway 1 15.38 38.46 46.15 26 mf if Indonesia 2 22.22 14.81 62.96 57 mf if 
Indonesia 1 21.82 38.18 40.00 27 mf mf Malaysia 60.38 11.32 28.30 58 mf mf 
Portugal 28.99 37.20 33.82 28 mf mf Thailand 2 39.29 10.71 50.00 59 mf if 
Venezuela 3 32.61 36.96 30.43 29 mf mf Russia 3 (*) 0.00 0.00 100.00 60 mf if 
India 1 46.95 36.59 16.46 30 mf mf Ecuador 3 (*) 20.00 0.00 80.00 61 mf if 
Brazil 1 10.00 36.00 54.00 31 mf if Chile 2 (*) 100.00 0.00 0.00 62 mf if 
 
Note:  
? An asterisk (*) behind the country’s name indicates a limited number of observation (see 
Table 9). 
? I -, I 0 and I + stand for Prob(Ifloat1 ≤ -0.33), Prob(0.33 < Ifloat1 < 0.33) and Prob(Ifloat1 ≥ 0.33) 
respectively. 
? The ranking was made according to I 0. 
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Table 14: Probability distribution of Ifloat1(12)  
 I - I 0 I + rank result IMF  I - I 0 I + rank result IMF
Morocco 3.88 93.20 2.91 1 if mf Brazil 1 0.00 47.73 52.27 32 mf if 
Czech Republic 3.33 90.00 6.67 2 if mf Brazil 2 25.00 47.50 27.50 33 mf mf 
Nigeria 3 5.00 90.00 5.00 3 if mf Israel 2 20.00 47.37 32.63 34 mf mf 
Switzerland 7.26 87.50 5.24 4 if if Singapore 18.62 46.90 34.48 35 mf mf 
Ecuador 1 0.00 84.29 15.71 5 if mf Sri Lanka 33.07 46.46 20.47 36 mf mf 
Norway 2 17.31 78.85 3.85 6 if mf Australia 2 36.79 45.08 18.13 37 mf if 
Mexico 2 2.70 78.38 18.92 7 if mf India 1 43.67 44.94 11.39 38 mf mf 
Greece 2 12.50 75.00 12.50 8 if mf Argentina 33.09 43.38 23.53 39 mf if 
Turkey 7.56 72.27 20.17 9 if mf Poland 1 15.66 40.96 43.37 40 mf mf 
Italy 10.53 71.05 18.42 10 if if Mexico 1 26.60 37.23 36.17 41 mf mf 
South Africa 9.31 68.63 22.06 11 if if Slovenia 15.19 36.71 48.10 42 mf mf 
Russia 2 5.26 68.42 26.32 12 if mf Peru 13.91 35.65 50.43 43 mf if 
New Zealand 19.89 66.48 13.64 13 if if Israel 1 19.23 34.62 46.15 44 mf mf 
Portugal 12.56 65.22 22.22 14 if mf Finland 42.11 34.21 23.68 45 mf if 
Korea 1 14.93 65.17 19.90 15 if mf Colombia 1 33.33 30.61 36.05 46 mf mf 
Venezuela 3 15.00 65.00 20.00 16 if mf India 2 20.73 30.49 48.78 47 mf if 
Canada 18.65 63.99 17.36 17 if if Egypt 23.20 30.40 46.40 48 mf mf 
Pakistan 19.90 63.78 16.33 18 if mf Venezuela 1 10.53 28.95 60.53 49 mf if 
Greece 1 10.27 63.70 26.03 19 if mf UK 1 46.03 28.04 25.93 50 mf if 
Sweden 35.29 63.53 1.18 20 if if Japan 26.37 27.33 46.30 51 mf if 
Hungary 36.54 61.54 1.92 21 if mf Brazil 3 72.73 27.27 0.00 52 mf if 
Ecuador 2 31.58 60.53 7.89 22 if mf Malaysia 59.57 25.53 14.89 53 mf mf 
Norway 1 5.00 60.00 35.00 23 if if Thailand 2 40.91 18.18 40.91 54 mf if 
Mexico 3 13.56 59.32 27.12 24 if if Indonesia 2 0.00 14.29 85.71 55 mf if 
Philippines 2 18.33 56.67 25.00 25 if if Bulgaria 42.86 14.29 42.86 56 mf if 
Philippines 1 43.75 56.25 0.00 26 if mf Korea 2 0.00 12.00 88.00 57 mf if 
Indonesia 1 13.21 55.97 30.82 27 if mf Australia 1 (*) 0.00 0.00 100.00 58 mf mf 
Nigeria 2 22.37 53.95 23.68 28 if if Russia 3 (*) 0.00 0.00 100.00 59 mf if 
Spain 5.56 53.70 40.74 29 if mf Chile 2 (*) 100.00 0.00 0.00 60 mf if 
Colombia 2 50.00 50.00 0.00 30 if if Venezuela 2 (*) 100.00 0.00 0.00 61 mf mf 
Chile 1 16.75 49.74 33.51 31 mf mf        
 
Note:  
? An asterisk (*) behind the country’s name indicates a limited number of observation (see 
Table 9). 
? I -, I 0 and I + stand for Prob(Ifloat1 ≤ -0.33), Prob(0.33 < Ifloat1 < 0.33) and Prob(Ifloat1 ≥ 0.33) 
respectively. 
? The ranking was made according to I 0. 
 
 
 
 
